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 This work analyzes the domestic emergency management policy of the United 
States and the extent to which it reflects an imbalance in U.S. national security policy.  It 
tests the thesis that despite the rhetoric of enhanced emergency management capabilities 
in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the U.S. still remains vulnerable to large-
scale domestic emergencies due to a lack of adequate planning and resources.  This 
vulnerability stems from a failure to implement lessons learned from large-scale domestic 
incidents such as the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the Northeast Blackout of 2003.  Since 
U.S. security policy is heavily focused on military and foreign policy issues, emergency 
response capabilities have not been a priority and are not substantial enough to respond 
effectively to a large-scale domestic emergency.  However, the two policy areas, 
foreign/military and domestic, are interconnected and mutually dependent.  Since the 
threat of terrorism can never be fully eradicated, foreign/military and domestic security 
policies should be balanced so that if and when another attack occurs, the U.S. can 
respond effectively.  
This work uses the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the Northeast Blackout of 2003, and 
the State of Connecticut’s emergency training exercises as case studies to test this thesis.  
Interviews with first responders provide additional original research to supplement the 
data gathered from online resources, articles, and government reports.  The concluding 
chapter demonstrates why a more balanced approach to security policy, both domestic 
and foreign/military policy, is necessary if the U.S. is to be successful in the “war on 
terrorism.”  This work proves the thesis that the U.S. still remains unprepared for 
another domestic terrorist attack or other large-scale domestic emergency, and provides 
recommendations to further enhance response capabilities. 
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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
  
 
Domestic national security is a complicated, comprehensive issue that 
challenges American political processes and structures.  Whether domestic crises are 
man-made or natural, national security includes being prepared to respond to them 
effectively, efficiently, and in a timely manner, regardless of where or when a crisis 
occurs. 
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, there have been initiatives to 
enhance domestic aspects of national security.  However, the United States has 
focused its national security policy largely on the ongoing military conflicts in 
Afghanistan and Iraq and on foreign policy issues.  This is reflected, for example, in 
the massive allocation of funds and resources to the Department of Defense.  
However, as Stephen Flynn points out, preparedness for domestic crises is also an 
essential element of national security strategy.  He argues that our response to 
domestic crises is deeply flawed, which has negative consequences for broader issues 
of national security.  Despite the creation of the Department of Homeland Security in 
response to the 9/11 attacks, the federal government still lags in helping communities 
prepare for, respond to, and recover from disasters, as was evident in the management 
of Hurricane Katrina and the Northeast Blackout of 2003. 
In The Edge of Disaster, Flynn addressed many weaknesses in our domestic 
security, such as the nation’s aged and poorly maintained infrastructure, including 
bridges, levees, reservoirs, power grids, and similar structures that are vital to the 
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day-to-day activities of all Americans.  The fact that these structures are deteriorating 
should be cause for alarm because their failure would be highly disruptive and 
because they provide an attractive target for terrorists who seek that disruption.  
Another weakness that Flynn found was the inadequacy of medical care for victims of 
large-scale emergencies.  There are problems of insufficient hospital capacity to meet 
the surge of demand in a crisis.   Often medical care and basic supplies have not been 
efficiently or effectively provided following disasters.  While the federal government 
plays a role in disaster response, first responders are preponderantly local, e.g. 
emergency medical technicians, fire fighters, and law enforcement personnel.  If they 
do not have adequate resources (such as up-to-date communications systems and 
sufficient equipment) and training to facilitate collaboration and ensure information 
sharing in an emergency situation, they will not be successful in their management 
efforts, causing potentially massive loss of life and economic damage.   
To assure effective response to domestic crises, Flynn argues that federal 
agencies such as the US Coast Guard and the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) should not be diverted from their emergency management 
responsibilities; moreover, they should be provided with sufficient funding, 
personnel, and training so that they can adequately respond to disasters.  This relates 
in part to the argument that Richard Clarke makes in Your Government Failed You, 
that the Department of Homeland Security is an ineffective organization.  He posits 
that it was created with a political agenda that misunderstood the problem that it was 
meant to solve, and was also a poorly structured organization run by unqualified 
political appointees. 
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Thesis and Research Questions 
This work tests the thesis that despite the post-9/11 rhetoric about change and 
coordination, the lessons of 9/11 were not translated into significantly improved 
means to respond to natural or man-made domestic disasters.  While lessons have 
been learned from large-scale emergencies such as 9/11 and infrastructure failures 
such as the Northeast Blackout of 2003, few of these lessons have been implemented 
into effective response plans at the local, state, or national levels.  These failures are 
indicators of a major flaw in U.S. national security policy, which focuses too heavily 
on foreign and defense aspects of security without adequate preparation for domestic 
aspects.   
We are more vulnerable to both natural and man-made disasters because we 
are failing to improve infrastructure and disaster management plans.  This negligence 
has negative implications for national security.  If we are unable to respond 
effectively to natural disasters, how will we be able to respond to terrorist attacks?  If 
our ailing infrastructure is ignored, will it provide vulnerabilities that can be used by 
terrorists?  It is important to include military and foreign policy initiatives in any 
national security policy, but it is equally important to ensure that the country is able to 
withstand attacks against it, which includes being able to prepare for, respond to, and 
recover from disasters of any magnitude or source.  In other words, there needs to be 
a balance between foreign/military and domestic national security policies in order to 
minimize our vulnerabilities and, as of yet, that balance has not been achieved. 
Relevant research questions to test this thesis include: 
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1.  What lessons about domestic disaster preparedness and response were learned 
from the response to 9/11? 
2.  To what extent were the lessons learned from 9/11 implemented, and how were 
those lessons reflected in the response to other large-scale emergencies such as the 
Northeast Blackout of 2003? 
3.  What lessons were learned from the Northeast Blackout, and to what degree have 
they been reflected in changes to emergency preparedness and response initiatives in 
Connecticut? 
4.  What are the national security implications that can be drawn from the responses 
to these large-scale emergences?  
5.  In what ways can U.S. domestic disaster response be improved to meet the 
country’s national security needs? 
 
Methodology 
 This work is based on analysis of relevant secondary material (books, journal 
articles, newspaper and news journal articles) and original documents (e.g., 
legislation, Congressional hearing testimony, official government reports).  This 
research is supplemented by interviews with first responders who have relevant 
experience in emergency response.   
 Additionally, two case studies will be used to demonstrate the vulnerabilities 
and potential for effectively handling domestic crisis.  The terrorist attacks of 9/11 
were chosen because they were the first major attack by a foreign terrorist 
organization on U.S. soil.  As such, they tested the ability of the U.S. to respond to a 
large-scale attack and serious vulnerabilities in response efforts were revealed.  The 
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Northeast Blackout of 2003 was chosen as a man-made disaster that affected a 
significant number of people and involved response efforts that were widespread and 
varied.  The State of Connecticut’s emergency training exercises were chosen as a 
case study to determine the extent to which lessons from 9/11 and the Blackout have 
been implemented and incorporated into emergency management practices.  
 
Literature Review 
Some of the literature focused narrowly on matters related to the response to 
domestic crises as areas of vulnerability that undermine national security overall.   
Such issues included failures with infrastructure and problems for effective initial 
response to man-made or natural disasters, which are especially important to note in 
the current age of terrorism.  Notable works in area include: two books by Stephen 
Flynn, America the Vulnerable: How Our Government is Failing to Protect Us from 
Terrorism1 and The Edge of Disaster: Rebuilding a Resilient Nation2; and a few 
works by Richard Clarke: Your Government Failed You: Breaking the Cycle of 
National Security Disasters,3 The Forgotten Homeland,4 and “Ten Years Later”.5   
There is a substantial literature on the lessons for national security to be drawn 
from the terrorist attacks of 9/11.  Literature used in this work include The 9/11 
                                                 
1 Stephen Flynn, America the Vulnerable: How Our Government is Failing to Protect Us 
from Terrorism (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2005). 
2 Stephen Flynn, The Edge of Disaster: Rebuilding a Resilient Nation (New York: Random 
House, 2007). 
3 Richard Clarke, Your Government Failed You: Breaking the Cycle of National Security 
Disasters (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2008). 
4 Richard Clarke, Rand Beers, et. al, The Forgotten Homeland (New York: The Century 
Foundation Press, 2006). 
5 Richard Clarke, “Ten Years Later,” The Atlantic Monthly, (January/February 2005), pp. 61-
77. 
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Commission Report6 and relevant government publications such as: Perspectives on 
9/11: Building Effectively on Hard Lessons7; and legislation including the USA 
PATRIOT Act and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act.   
A few works focused on the Northeast Blackout of 2003.  Relevant texts 
include: Enhancing New York City’s Emergency Preparedness,8 which provided an 
overview of the response to the Blackout as well as lessons learned from the response 
to the incident; Effects of Catastrophic Events on Transportation System Management 
and Operations,9 which focused on the effects the Blackout had on transportation 
systems and evacuation efforts; and Blackout of 2003: Pubic Health Effects and 
Emergency Response,10 which studied the public health response during the Blackout 
and areas where improvements could be made. 
 
This Work’s Contribution to the Literature 
The preponderance of writing on the 9/11 attacks focuses on national security 
problems in terms of military and foreign policy issues.  The literature on domestic 
response to the specific crisis of the Northeast Blackout does not consider its 
implications for national security.  The contribution of this work is to analyze the 
                                                 
6 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon The United States, The 9/11 Commission 
Report (New York, New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Ltd., 2004). 
7 Hearing before the Select Committee on Homeland Security House of Representatives, One 
Hundred Eighth Congress, First Session (September 10, 2003). 
8 New York City Emergency Response Task Force, Enhancing New York City’s Emergency 
Preparedness: A Report to Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg, (New York City: October 28, 
2003). 
9 Allan J. DeBlasio, Terrance J. Regan, Margaret E. Zirker, Katherine S. Fichter, Kristin 
Lovejoy, Effects of Catastrophic Events on Transportation System Management and 
Operations (Cambridge, Massachusetts: April 2004). 
10 Mark E. Beatty, Scot Phelps, Chris Rohner, Isaac Weisfuse, “Blackout of 2003: Public 
Health Effects and Emergency Response,” Public Health Reports, Vol. 121 (Jan-Feb 2006). 
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lessons for national security from response to domestic crises, using one caused by 
terrorists, 9/11, and one that demonstrated our ailing infrastructure, the Blackout.   
This work provides some insight as to how our current emergency response 
plans have evolved, whether the lessons learned from previous disasters are being 
implemented and whether initiatives have been successful at solving the problems 
they were intended to solve.   
 
Organization of the Work 
The 9/11 attacks* dramatically exposed many U.S. security11vulnerabilities.  
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks a variety of groups and individuals attempted 
to draw lessons from the tragedy to strengthen U.S. defenses against terrorist attacks 
and enable the country to respond more effectively to any that might occur in the 
future.  Chapter One analyses the lessons that were learned from the attacks of 9/11 
that relate to ways U.S. domestic security could be improved, areas in which 
vulnerabilities existed, and how domestic security could be strengthened.   
A second case study analyzes the degree to which lessons learned from the 
9/11 attacks were implemented during a subsequent major emergency and what areas 
still needed to be improved.  Chapter Two focuses on the man-made disaster of the 
Northeast Blackout of 2003.  As Flynn argued in The Edge of Disaster, ensuring that 
critical infrastructure is up-to-date is imperative in order to reduce attractiveness as a 
terrorist target.  The Blackout illustrated how vulnerable U.S. physical infrastructure 
                                                 
*The terrorist attacks of 9/11 resulted in planes crashing into the World Trade Center, the 
Pentagon, and a field in Pennsylvania.  Since the destruction caused by the attacks in New 
York City was so substantial and efforts to respond were flawed, New York City is the case 
study for the 9/11 attacks. 
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is to outside forces and how these vulnerabilities affect U.S. national security.  This 
emergency also illuminated how U.S. reliance on modern technology was a severe 
national security risk.   
Chapter Three focuses on the extent to which the lessons from 9/11 and the 
Blackout have been implemented in Connecticut.  Connecticut was chosen because of 
its close proximity to New York City, which was greatly affected by the terrorist 
attacks of 9/11 and the Northeast Blackout.  Since Connecticut is so close to a major 
city and is therefore likely to be the target of another terrorist attack, it is important to 
see how Connecticut has developed and improved its emergency preparedness 
initiatives and response plans.   
This work ends with a concluding chapter, which discusses the general 
findings and the degree to which the thesis of this work was proven.  Additionally, 
the contribution that this work makes to the literature on the topic is analyzed and 
areas for further research are identified. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
SEPTEMBER 11TH:  WHAT WENT WRONG? 
 
 
 
 
 The terrorist attacks of 9/11 illustrated the ways in which our domestic 
security was lacking and how our domestic response to large-scale emergencies 
needed to be improved if the United States hoped to be able to respond to disasters in 
the future.  This chapter begins by analyzing the lessons learned from the terrorist 
attacks of 9/11 that related to issues of domestic security.  These include lessons for 
first responders, policy makers in the federal government, and the private sector.  
 The second part of the chapter focuses on the vulnerabilities that became 
apparent during the response to the 9/11 attacks.  They include the resources upon 
which first responders relied (such as communication systems) as well as structural, 
procedural and operational problems.  They also include failures such as breakdowns 
in communication and inadequate standard operating procedures in the federal 
government’s response to the attacks, as well as the lack of emergency management 
plans and evacuation procedures in the private sector.   
 The chapter concludes by analyzing recommendations by the 9/11 
Commission and other sources that directly relate to issues of domestic security.  
They fall into three general categories: recommendations to improve resources for 
first responders, including establishing standard operating procedures and improving 
communications; recommendations for bureaucrats and policymakers, including 
increased oversight of homeland security efforts; and recommendations for the 
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private sector, including standards for developing evacuation plans and emergency 
response procedures. 
 Many different groups in and out of the government investigated the causes 
and implications of the 9/11 attacks.  Of these, particularly influential 
recommendations were made in five reports.  The most prominent was written by an 
independent joint commission established by Congress and the Executive Branch, 
The 9/11 Commission Report.  An investigation that focused on the Fire Department 
of New York (FDNY) and the emergency medical services (EMS) units was 
conducted by the consulting firm McKinsey & Company, titled Increasing FDNY’s 
Preparedness.  Several reports by think tanks added to the wealth of information and 
recommendations, including two task force reports by the Council on Foreign 
Relations, Emergency Responders: Drastically Underfunded, Dangerously 
Unprepared and American Still Unprepared – America Still in Danger.  A book by 
the RAND Corporation provides further research and influential recommendations, 
Protecting Emergency Responders: Lessons Learned from Terrorist Attacks.  In 
referring to the findings and recommendations of these various sources, the following 
designations will be used: 9/11 Report for The 9/11 Commission Report; McKinsey 
Report for Increasing FDNY’s Preparedness; First Responders Report for Emergency 
Responders: Drastically Underfunded, Dangerously Unprepared; CFR Report for 
American Still Unprepared – America Still in Danger; and RAND Report for 
Protecting Emergency Responders: Lessons Learned from Terrorist Attacks. 
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Lessons for Domestic Security from the 9/11 Attacks 
 
 Because the United States had never before experienced the extent of 
destruction caused by terrorist attacks on 9/11, many lessons were learned about the 
roles and responsibilities of local, state, and federal government agencies, and the 
private sector in responding to a large-scale disaster.  Moreover, it became clear that 
even if roles and responsibilities were clear and established enough to be carried out 
with some degree of effectiveness, they needed to be supported by appropriate 
resources, training, and formal procedures. 
 
First responders 
 
When a large-scale emergency occurs, local fire fighters, law enforcement, 
and EMS are expected to be able to respond to the disaster in a timely and effective 
manner.  They are primarily tasked with rescuing and treating victims.  First 
responders also need to consider other factors that contribute to how well they are 
able to respond, including planning and managing an organized response effort, 
establishing a clear chain of command, using standard operating procedures to make 
certain that the response is well coordinated and productive, and assessing the 
situation to determine if more help is needed.  Unfortunately on 9/11, some of these 
goals were not achieved.  While many first responders acted heroically despite flawed 
equipment, inadequate training, and bureaucratic confusion, the response to the 
terrorist attacks demonstrated the need for improved resources for first responders. 
The first lesson from 9/11 was that in order for first responders to save lives in 
a large-scale emergency, communications equipment (which serves a vital function 
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for first responders during a disaster) needed to be updated.12  Additionally, in order 
for communication to occur between different jurisdictions and departments, 
communications equipment needed to be interoperable.13   
The second lesson was that coordination with other departments, neighboring 
jurisdictions, and representatives from the private sector must occur before a disaster 
strikes in the planning phases and must be maintained during the emergency response 
phase.14  This interagency collaboration is important in various aspects of disaster 
planning and response, including training exercises, ensuring that standard operating 
procedures (SOPs) can be integrated across agency lines, and ensuring that 
communication remains open during emergency response so that everyone is 
informed about important developments.15  Exercises that practice responses to real 
disaster scenarios should also be held with other agencies and jurisdictions so that 
when a disaster occurs cooperation between different organizations can be maximized 
and carried out smoothly.16  
The third lesson was that SOPs, including chain-of-command structure and 
delegating roles and responsibilities, needed to be further developed and implemented 
by first responder organizations.17  While technology issues were a contributing factor 
to the hampered communication efforts of first responders, a lack of SOPs for an 
                                                 
12 http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/05/18/terror/main618272.shtml 
13 http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press_release_0529.shtm 
14 Warren B. Rudman, Richard A. Clarke, Jamie F. Metzl, Emergency Responders: 
Drastically Underfunded, Dangerously Unprepared (New York, New York: Council on 
Foreign Relations, 2003), p. 23. 
15 McKinsey & Company, p. 21. 
16 Brian A. Jackson, D. J. Peterson, James T. Bartis, Tom LaTourrette, Irene T. 
Brahmakulam, Ari Houser, Jerry M. Sollinger, Protecting Emergency Responders: Lessons 
Learned from Terrorist Attacks (California: RAND, 2002), p. 61. 
17 Ibid., p. 62. 
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incident as extensive as the terrorist attacks created confusion and mismanagement of 
both equipment and human capital.  On 9/11, at various points throughout the day, the 
command and control structure was unclear.18  Since clear leadership is imperative in 
an emergency, SOPs for large-scale incidents should be developed and 
implemented.19  In addition, procedures for off-duty personnel, personnel changing 
shifts, and for personnel who are not assigned to the emergency need to be included 
in any emergency response plan.20  Training should be conducted on a routine basis to 
ensure that the standard operating procedures listed above are understood by all 
emergency responders, as well as those operating in the private sector.21 
 The last major lesson pertained to the ability of first responders and 
commanders to access and gather intelligence information and updates about the 
situation as it occurred.22  First responders need to be able to determine what is 
occurring on the ground as well as what is happening beyond the incident to make 
informed decisions about the distribution of personnel and resources.  Incident 
commanders must also have appropriate systems in place to manage this information, 
as well as a way to track their resources and deployed units.23 
 
The federal government 
 While local first responders are responsible for the immediate response to an 
emergency, the federal government has an important role to play in disaster response 
                                                 
18 McKinsey & Company, pp. 33, 48. 
19 Ibid., p. 14. 
20 Ibid., p. 15. 
21 Rudman, p. 23. 
22 Ibid., p. 12. 
23 Ibid., p. 13. 
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when there is a large-scale emergency that has national implications or overwhelms 
the capacity of local, state, or regional response.24   
 A major lesson from the 9/11 terrorist attacks was that there was no central 
agency in the federal government to coordinate activities related to homeland 
security.  Many different agencies, such as the Transportation Security 
Administration, U.S. Coast Guard, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection, among 
others, play an active role in ensuring that the United States is protected from attacks.  
However, prior to 9/11, they were spread across the federal bureaucracy with limited 
coordination among them, which led to a lack of accountability.25  To ensure that 
these agencies communicated with each other and shared pertinent information that 
might prevent a catastrophic event such as another terrorist attack, agencies that 
supported U.S. homeland security efforts needed to develop a more effective system 
to encourage information sharing.26     
 A second lesson was that the federal government needed to work more with 
local and state emergency response agencies to develop a national response plan and 
implement standards for responding to a large-scale emergency.27  While local and 
state emergency managers provide a wealth of experience in disaster response and are 
crucial to the creation of a national response plan, other experts in the field, such as 
academics and representatives of the private sector must also be included in the 
                                                 
24 Michael K. Lindell, Carla Prater, Ronald W. Perry, Introduction to Emergency 
Management (Massachusetts: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2007), p. 28. 
25 Patricia A. Dalton, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, 
Financial Management, and Intergovernmental Relations, Committee on Government 
Reform, House of Representatives, Combating Terrorism: Intergovernmental Cooperation in 
the Development of a National Strategy to Enhance State and Local Preparedness 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Accountability Office, 2002), p. 2. 
26 http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/rewrite/budget/fy2005/homeland.html  
27 Rudman, p. 4. 
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process, since they have expertise in emergency management from other 
perspectives.28 
 A third lesson was that oversight of homeland security in Congress was 
fragmented and that “the proliferation of committees and subcommittees [made] it 
hard to devise a coherent homeland security policy and focused homeland defense 
system.”29  Since there are so many agencies that work with homeland security and 
homeland security issues relate to other issues, there was no central committee to 
oversee all homeland security issues.  This became especially relevant once the 
Department of Homeland Security was created.  Since congressional committees are 
responsible for oversight to ensure effectiveness and accountability, creating a 
primary committee in Congress would streamline the process.  Ideally, a homeland 
security committee in both the Senate and the House of Representatives would be 
able to make funding and resource decisions for homeland security initiatives in a 
nonpartisan manner.30  Determining funding allocations is an important part of 
Congressional responsibility.  It is particularly imperative when dealing with 
homeland security since without funding many local and state jurisdictions are not 
able to provide their first responders and other groups responsible for emergency 
management with the necessary equipment and resources to properly respond to a 
large-scale emergency.31 
 
 
 
                                                 
28 Gary Hart, Warren B. Rudman, Stephen E. Flynn, American Still Unprepared – America 
Still in Danger (New York, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2002), p. 33. 
29 Rudman, p. 19. 
30 The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 421. 
31 Rudman, p. 10. 
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The private sector 
 The private sector has a crucial role to play in disaster planning, response, and 
recovery.  Since it controls 85% of the infrastructure in the United States, its members 
must take an active role to ensure that their buildings, facilities, particularly those that 
are considered essential systems or high-impact targets, and other infrastructure 
adhere to national safety standards and are constructed in a way that takes potential 
disasters into consideration.32  Other components of infrastructure, including 
communications systems, should be included in building codes to support first 
responders.33     
 One of the most common criticisms of the private sector’s response to the 
9/11 attacks was that most companies did not have adequate evacuation procedures.34  
In order for a company to save lives, it must develop and implement an effective 
emergency response plan, and those plans must be carried out in training exercises to 
make certain that employees are familiar with the established emergency protocols.35   
 The third lesson applied to private sector emergency response services.  In the 
response to the 9/11 attacks, many private companies that engage in first responder 
activities did not follow established procedures.  For example, instead of getting 
authorization from dispatchers to provide on-scene support, private organizations 
bypassed the dispatchers and simply arrived at the scene to assist with emergency 
response efforts.  Coordinating with local first responders and abiding by previously 
                                                 
32 9/11 Commission Report, p. 317. 
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established SOPs would ensure a more effective response, fewer lives lost, and a 
proper distribution of resources.36 
 
Areas of Vulnerability 
 
 The City of New York experienced a similar situation to the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks in 1993, but on a much smaller scale.  While terrorists tried to bomb the 
World Trade Center (WTC) in 1993, the structural damage and lives lost then did not 
compare to the second attacks.  The attacks of 9/11 posed a more serious challenge 
because first responders had not previously dealt with a situation of this magnitude.  
Therefore, the systems and procedures they had in place were quickly overwhelmed.37  
 
First responders 
 
It became apparent on 9/11 that the communications systems on which the 
local first responder agencies had relied were not sufficient in a large-scale 
emergency.  First, the communications systems simply could not handle the 
situation.38  The radio spectrum of the equipment used by first responders to the 
attacks that day was not enough to support their communications.  The volume of 
communications, from police, fire, and EMS, overwhelmed the system as well as the 
dispatchers.  This was exacerbated by the fact that many of the communications 
facilities in the immediate area of the WTC were knocked out by the attacks.39  
 A problem for first responders that had been encountered in the earlier attacks 
on the WTC was that their communication equipment could not operate in the high-
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rise buildings that dominate the New York City landscape.  Therefore, on 9/11 many 
radios failed simply because the first responders were surrounded by skyscrapers.40  
While the portable radios work better when there are repeater systems, the repeater 
system in the WTC was found to be damaged as a result of the attacks.41  The old 
equipment that proved to be insufficient in 1993 had not been updated even though 
new radios had been ordered in 1999.  However, efforts to utilize them before 9/11 
were unsuccessful.42  Fortunately, the attacks did not take place on a subway or in a 
tunnel, because the radio communication equipment that the emergency services 
personnel used could not operate in those locations.43  The issues that first responders 
encountered with communications equipment not only hindered response efforts but 
also made “accountability of personnel impossible.”44  
Since the repeater channels were not working the fire chiefs who were in 
charge on 9/11 decided to use two other channels – a tactical channel to communicate 
with the fire fighters, and a command channel to communicate with the other chiefs.45  
Many of the firefighters did not know that this switch had occurred, and those who 
did know did not receive all of the messages because even the tactical channel was 
not operating to full capacity.  Matters were made worse by the fact that the 
frequency of the command channel that the fire chiefs were using was being shared 
with a citywide first responder channel.  Therefore, the chiefs had a difficult time 
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communicating with each other because their channel was overwhelmed with other 
emergency responder dispatches and communications.46   
When fire chiefs and other incident commanders were able to locate their 
units and determine the status of personnel, they relied on magnetic boards that were 
eventually destroyed when the towers collapsed.  The magnetic boards had magnetic 
pieces that could be moved around the board to indicate the changing location of units 
or resources.  While these boards had been sufficient ways to track personnel in the 
past, they proved to be inadequate on 9/11.  The information that the incident 
commanders obtained about their units was not easily transferable to other agencies 
or command posts, and since the data could not be stored or backed up, it was all lost 
when the towers collapsed.47   
 While first responders experienced problems communicating with members of 
the same department due to dated equipment and overburdened systems, 
communication issues went beyond the boundaries of each agency.  Since each of the 
first responder agencies maintained its own communications systems that were not 
interoperable, different agencies could not communicate with each other.  For 
example, fire fighters could not receive updates from law enforcement officers, and 
emergency medical technicians could not coordinate with fire fighters to determine 
what medical resources were needed, and so on.48   
 Communication between departments and agencies was not hampered solely 
because of technological barriers.  Bureaucratic tensions and a general lack of 
coordination prevented the NYPD and FDNY from sharing critical information about 
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what was going on.49  There were no senior NYPD officers at the Incident Command 
Post that had been established by the FDNY, nor were there any FDNY chiefs in the 
helicopter that was hovering above the WTC.50  The lack of coordination over 
intelligence and command and control led to unnecessary confusion and furthered 
aggravated the situation.  While Mayor Giuliani attempted to bridge the gap between 
the various first responder agencies, he was unable to do so.51  
 Some breakdowns in procedure occurred on 9/11 within the FDNY that 
interfered with the response efforts.  First, some units arrived at the WTC and 
proceeded into the burning towers or other areas of the site without first “staging,” or 
reporting to their superiors at the designated check-in points.  This led to chiefs not 
being able to keep track of their units, and units going into the buildings without vital 
information.52  Second, some units that were assigned to other parts of the city came 
to Ground Zero to help without authorization from dispatchers.  Dispatchers must 
give authorization for unassigned units to participate in response efforts because only 
the dispatchers know what resources and personnel are needed.  Since these units did 
not receive authorization from the dispatchers, they might not have been needed at the 
WTC site, therefore putting more firefighters in danger, or they might have been 
needed to respond to other emergencies in the city.53  Third, a full recall order was 
sent to all off-duty fire personnel.  However, since the recall procedure had not been 
used in 30 years and personnel were not trained in how to respond in the event of a 
recall, there was substantial confusion about to whom or where to report and what 
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was expected of them, leading to an ineffective and haphazard response.54  Fourth, 
because the attacks occurred around the time for shift change, responders who were 
going off-duty stayed on duty to help with response efforts.  Not having a procedure 
in place for this sort of situation put more lives at risk and added to the heavy flow of 
information and requests that the dispatchers had to direct.55 
 Some of these procedural errors could have been prevented if a more 
organized leadership structure and more effective SOPs for command and control had 
been in place.  Particularly because of the communication issues described above, the 
FDNY had a difficult time determining which personnel were in charge; throughout 
the day there were various command posts operating without knowledge of other 
command posts.56  The structural collapse of the Twin Towers exacerbated this 
problem as incident command posts in the lobbies of the Twin Towers were 
destroyed.57  These factors, in turn, led to more unorganized first responder efforts.  
The Port Authority Police Department also had no SOPs for joint command or radio 
communications procedures, which contributed to the overall confusion.58  
 As a result of SOPs being either non-existent or not followed, emergency 
managers were unclear as to what personnel and resources were needed to properly 
respond to the attacks.  For that reason, they called on neighboring emergency 
response agencies to provide support.  Unfortunately, however, no formal mutual aid 
agreements had been established prior to 9/11, so not only did the emergency 
managers in the area not know what resources were available to them from other 
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agencies, they also did not know how to request or direct those resources.  Since the 
emergency responder organizations did not have SOPs that could be integrated, 
personnel from neighboring jurisdictions were unfamiliar with the protocols that 
existed within the local responder agencies.59 
 Obtaining information is an imperative part of emergency response.  Without 
accurate data, emergency managers cannot make informed decisions or manage an 
effective response plan.  On 9/11, incident commanders did not have a stable, 
continuous, or accurate source of information.60  This forced them to make decisions 
that were not fully informed, putting more lives at risk than was necessary.61  The 
problems incident commanders faced was partly due to lack of or limited interagency 
coordination, especially between the NYPD and the FDNY.  For example, if a fire 
chief had been in the NYPD helicopter mentioned above, he would have been able to 
provide crucial information to his colleagues on the ground to improve the response.62 
 Another factor that contributed to the lack of intelligence was the 
uncoordinated media response.  There was no video feed established at the incident 
command posts, nor was there a media liaison to communicate information directly to 
the incident commanders.  If there had been a steady stream of information from the 
news media, fire chiefs in charge would have been able to make more accurate 
assessments of the situation and distribute personnel and resources more efficiently.63  
So, in addition to communications issues between first-responder agencies, incident 
commanders also had limited, if any, access to reliable means of communication with 
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other localities, the state government, and federal agencies due a lack of secure 
radios, telephones, videoconferencing technologies or other forms of 
communication.64  
 
The federal government 
 For many years, the national agencies that dealt with issues of homeland 
security functioned well in separate departments.  However, the attacks of 9/11 
showed the country that the fragmented homeland security structure created gaps in 
communication and failed to facilitate information sharing.  For example, agencies 
that are responsible for collecting intelligence on terrorists, such as the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), did not share information with other agencies that rely 
on such intelligence to carry out their duties. What was perhaps most disturbing about 
the terrorist attacks was the fact that the FBI did not or could not share critical 
intelligence within its own agency.  Outdated computer systems and bureaucratic 
blockages prevented information from getting from a field office to another field 
office or FBI Headquarters.65   
 On 9/11, no national response plan existed to coordinate different agencies, 
departments, and jurisdictions in emergency management or to establish SOPs to 
support emergency response efforts.  Collaboration between the federal government 
and local and state governments around emergency response was minimal, and the 
lack of coordination was apparent in the lapses in communication that occurred that 
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day and the unclear roles and expectations that hindered emergency management 
plans.66   
 The issue of funding and federal oversight was brought to light in the wake of 
the 9/11 attacks.  People wondered why the first responders in New York did not have 
better equipment, why no standards for private sector preparedness had been 
established, and how coordination between two primary response organizations could 
have been so limited.  Congress did not have a primary committee to oversee 
emergency management practices or to determine how funding should be allocated.67  
Since the federal government was concerned with making sure all states got some 
funding, cities like New York were not always prioritized when distributing 
funding.68  They were left with outdated equipment and no funding for essential 
training programs.  When funding was made available, there was no central 
legislative committee to ensure that the funds were being dispensed in a timely 
manner or used for initiatives or equipment that were truly needed. 
 
The private sector 
 The first attacks on the WTC in 1993 should have been a wake-up call for the 
private sector, but unfortunately they were not.  As a result, companies in the WTC 
and surrounding areas that were affected by the attacks did not have sufficient 
emergency response plans. For the few emergency response plans that were 
established in the private sector, the companies did not perform drills.  If the 
companies had performed drills and implemented an evacuation strategy, not only 
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would weaknesses of the plans been identified so that modifications could have been 
made, but employees would also have been familiar with the evacuation procedure. 69   
 While New York City had experienced the first terrorist attacks in 1993, the 
WTC was considered structurally sound, and not many people imagined the scenario 
that played out on 9/11 or the potential destruction it would cause.  Since many 
emergency managers on 9/11 did not expect the Twin Towers to collapse,70 incident 
commanders did not take precautions when establishing command posts in the 
lobbies of the WTC buildings.71  In addition to the buildings not being able to 
withstand the impact of the planes, the communication systems in the WTC center 
that supported the first responder communication networks, like the repeater system, 
were not functioning properly because of the attacks.72   
 On 9/11, many private first responder companies and organizations responded 
to the attacks without authorization from city dispatchers.  While they responded with 
good intentions and had probably circumvented established protocols for responding 
in the past, their efforts actually complicated matters due to the extent of the situation 
and the degree to which dispatchers were overwhelmed and the disaster response was 
unorganized.73 
 Information sharing between the public and private sector was found to be 
severely limited.  Even though the private sector controls such a large majority of 
infrastructure in the US and because the private sector is the very first to respond to a 
disaster because its employees are immediately at risk, little coordination existed 
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between the private sector and the federal government.  Therefore, the private sector 
did not have access to critical information and could not respond more effectively to 
the attacks.  Legal concerns are a key element of why coordination is so limited 
between the two sectors.74  
Recommendations 
 Many reports and documents surfaced after 9/11 proposing changes that 
needed to be made to our national security structure to improve response to domestic, 
large-scale emergencies.  The five most influential reports (indicated above) included 
the following recommendations. 
 
First responders  
 Several reports recommended changes in equipment, substantial and 
continuous training, improved methods to monitor and manage personnel and 
resources, establishment of effective SOPs, and extensive interagency coordination.  
These recommendations targeted problems faced by first responders in the 9/11 
attacks.   
Suggestions for improving equipment began with concern about effective 
radio communication.  Some of the problems that plagued first responders on 9/11 
would not have occurred if reliable equipment had been in place and first responders 
had been trained in its operation.  Proposed changes included the McKinsey Report 
recommendation that the new portable radios that were acquired in 1999 be evaluated 
to determine if they are more effective than the older radios.  If found to be effective, 
the McKinsey Report recommended that they should replace the older radios.  If not 
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found suitable, alternative communication systems should be found.75  In particular, 
the Report highlighted the need for communications equipment that functioned in 
high-rise buildings, tunnels and subways.76   
Installing repeater systems (i.e. systems that facilitate radio communications 
by transmitting signals over a wider area) in high-rise buildings was one way to 
improve technological issues that surfaced on 9/11.77  The CFR Report suggested that 
off-the-shelf technology that integrates different radio platforms could be utilized to 
achieve communications interoperability.78  This Report also recommended that first 
responders receive adequate training in any new portable radio equipment.  This 
training should include disaster simulation exercises to ensure that first responders are 
familiar with the equipment in emergency situations.79   
The CFR Report also recommended that the federal government provide 
funding so that first responders could receive communications equipment, protective 
gear, detection equipment and proper training to enhance response capabilities.80  The 
Report recognized the importance of assessing any new equipment and training 
received by first responders.  Therefore, it recommended making contracts to ensure 
that long-term maintenance of both equipment and training programs remain up-to-
date and functional.81  The Report further recommended that grants be provided to 
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have retired first-responders perform evaluations on the status of the different 
components of urban emergency response preparedness.82   
 Even though first responders were not responding to a nuclear, biological, 
chemical, or radiological attack, they were exposed to many hazardous materials 
(hazmat) such as fibrous glass, particulate matter, and asbestos that have been linked 
to respiratory illness.83  The CFR Report recommended obtaining protective gear and 
detection equipment for emergency personnel so that in the event of a hazmat 
incident, first responders could provide assistance to affected civilians.84  Moreover, 
the McKinsey Report emphasized the importance of expanding hazmat capabilities, 
including interagency training and assessing potential threats and emergency service 
capabilities.85  The RAND Report also recommended interagency training to build 
relationships and facilitate information sharing amongst different first responder 
agencies.86   
 So that incident commanders and emergency managers are better able to track 
personnel and resources, the McKinsey Report proposed that better methods for 
monitoring the status of units replace the magnetic boards that had been used on 9/11.  
The system that Report offered for evaluation and possible deployment was either a 
wireless electronic command board or a portable PC-based electronic board that 
would be able to back up data if the board were destroyed and would assist incident 
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commanders through enhanced tracking and communication abilities.87  Additionally, 
the McKinsey Report found that in order for pertinent information to be shared within 
and among departments and agencies, a better radio channel structure should be 
established so that the volume of data does not overwhelm communications systems 
and channels do not overlap.88  The 9/11 Report recommended that Congress should 
support legislation to increase the radio spectrum in a timely fashion.89    
 
Standard operating procedures 
 Many of the recommendations in the various reports focused on establishing 
more effective SOPs.  The following areas were singled out for change: command 
and control structure; recall procedures; clarifying roles and responsibilities for 
dispatchers; and mutual aid agreements.  To enhance the value of these changes, 
reports recommended extensive training to ensure that they are carried out effectively 
in an emergency.       
To ensure that standard operating procedures, including a clear command and 
control structure in a large-scale emergency, are implemented, the McKinsey Report 
recommended that emergency response organizations expand the use of the Incident 
Command System (ICS), a component of the National Incident Management System 
(NIMS).  This way, all first responders would have a common standard for flexible 
command and control, and different agencies and levels of government could more 
effectively coordinate their efforts.  In order for ICS to be properly executed in an 
emergency situation, the McKinsey Report recommended that first responders receive 
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sufficient training in its principles and procedures, and that continuous training be 
provided for high-ranking personnel since their role in ICS is so imperative.90  
The last recall before 9/11 had occurred thirty years earlier.  Therefore, many 
first responders were not familiar with procedures in place for a recall.  The 
McKinsey Report recommended that emergency response agencies should establish 
formal recall packages that identify what procedures and personnel responsibilities 
would be in place in designated emergencies.91  The Report also suggested that off-
duty personnel who are not recalled should not be allowed to participate in response 
efforts.92  Engaging in training exercises will help emergency responders understand 
these procedures in addition to understanding why following them is important.  
Enforcing rules regarding recall procedures is necessary to ensure that personnel are 
distributed effectively.93  Specific protocols for staging should also be included in this 
training because some units did not stage before they arrived on the scene and did not 
receive important information to assist in their efforts, and incident commanders 
could not track those units.94  
In addition to clarifying roles and responsibilities for on-site emergency 
response personnel, the McKinsey Report highlighted the importance of determining 
how dispatchers respond to a large-scale emergency.  Because they are responsible 
for coordinating all emergency response personnel and resources, establishing 
effective means to handle the amount of data and communications that comes in 
during an emergency is paramount.  To ensure effective management of resources, 
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the Report proposed that dispatcher structure be evaluated to determine the 
appropriate roles and responsibilities for dispatchers in a large-scale emergency.  
Once those SOPs are established, the dispatchers should participate in training and 
drill exercises to make sure that the SOPs are successful.95   
On 9/11, the City of New York relied on neighboring jurisdictions to support 
its emergency response capabilities.  However, no SOPs existed for how those outside 
resources should be requested or managed.96  Incident commanders did not have a 
true sense of the resources they actually needed or what resources were available to 
them from neighboring authorities.  To remedy this problem, the McKinsey Report 
recommended adoption of mutual aid agreements outlining: the resources that would 
be available from each department or agency; how they would be requested and 
deployed; and how they would be managed by the commanding organization.  To 
support these agreements, joint training exercises would be needed so that first 
responders would be accustomed to working with outside personnel and resources.97  
One major theme in the McKinsey Report’s recommendations was that 
interagency coordination is necessary for an emergency response plan to be 
effectively executed in both the preparation and response stages.  The First 
Responders Report highlighted this crucial element in its recommendations, stating 
that  
DHS should develop a comprehensive national program 
for exercises that coordinates exercise activities 
involving federal agencies, state and local governments, 
and representatives from appropriate private sector 
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entities including hospitals, the media, 
telecommunications providers, and others.98  
 
That Report recommended that non-profit groups such as the American Red Cross 
should also be involved in training exercises.  The First Responders Report 
emphasized the importance of ensuring that resources, roles, and responsibilities are 
fluid across agency lines, especially in the event that mutual aid agreements are 
enacted or funding is requested from higher levels of government.  Improving 
emergency operation center capabilities could also support interagency coordination, 
as recommended in the Report.99  In addition, a Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) Report highlighted the advantages of engaging in regional cooperation so that 
large metropolitan areas would be better prepared when an emergency occurs.100 
 
The federal government 
 Recommendations for change by the federal government focused on 
establishing a single body to exercise oversight in Congress, streamlining the funding 
process, and coordinating more effectively with state and local emergency response 
agencies to create a national strategy for emergency preparedness and response. 
One of the main recommendations of the 9/11 Commission relating to 
bureaucratic issues was that “Congress should create a single, principal point of 
oversight and review for homeland security.”101  This idea was expanded upon in the 
First Responders Report, which suggested that the United States House of 
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Representatives should make the House Select Committee on Homeland Security a 
standing committee and “give it a formal, leading role in the authorization of all 
emergency responder expenditures in order to streamline the federal budgetary 
process.”102  It also suggested that the United States Senate should merge emergency 
preparedness and response oversight into the Senate Government Affairs 
Committee.103  
 To assist Congress in determining how funding should be allocated to first 
responder agencies, the 9/11 Report recommended that funding be based on 
assessments and risk analysis to identify the areas most vulnerable to attacks.104  The 
First Responders Report added that these assessments should be based on population, 
population density, vulnerability assessment, and critical infrastructure.105  To 
streamline the funding process and ensure that funding is distributed as quickly as 
possible to facilitate timely purchases of updated and improved equipment, the First 
Responders Report recommended that homeland security grant programs be 
reevaluated to reduce redundant programs; that states should create a list of priorities 
so that federal funding is spent in areas that need funding the most; and that all 
appropriations bills in Congress should include strict timelines for distribution of 
funds.106  Additionally, Congress should provide emergency responder grants that are 
multi-layered to ensure long-term training and planning initiatives.107   
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 To assist state and local emergency response agencies in determining roles, 
responsibilities, and objectives in an emergency situation, the First Responders 
Report recommended that the DHS and Department of Health and Human Services 
work with these agencies to establish standards and guidelines for emergency 
preparedness.108  Additionally, the Report called for establishment of a “National 
Institute for Best Practices in Emergency Preparedness” within DHS to disseminate 
best practices and lessons learned to first responders.109  A GAO Report found that 
there needed to be a clear definition of roles and responsibilities between federal, 
state, and local authorities for emergency preparedness and response.110  
 
The private sector 
 Recommendations for the reports focused on developing standards for the 
private sector so that they implement effective emergency response plans, fostering 
public-private partnerships, and creating incentives for the private sector to support 
first responder communications systems.   
The main recommendation that the 9/11 Commission made for the private 
sector was that it adopt the American National Standards Institute’s suggested 
standard for private sector preparedness.  The Commission went on to say that private 
sector preparedness “is not a luxury; it is a cost of doing business in the post-9/11 
world.  It is ignored at a tremendous potential cost in lives, money, and national 
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security.”111  Delineating the role of private first responder companies in a large-scale 
emergency is also an important part of effective emergency response planning. 
The CFR Report focused more on the political barriers to creating public-
private partnerships that would facilitate more effective emergency preparedness.  
One strategy the Report proposed to increase information sharing was to invite 
private sector experts to conduct vulnerability assessments and participate in training 
activities and exercises.112  Additionally, reducing the legal constraints that the private 
sector must operate within when dealing with the federal government and access to 
information will facilitate these partnerships.113  Specifically, the Report 
recommended creating a “fast track” security clearance system for appropriate private 
sector leaders, lenient antitrust laws, and Freedom of Information Act exemptions.   
One last recommendation that the McKinsey Report offered was that the 
private sector should assist with obtaining and installing communications systems that 
would support first responder communications equipment, such as repeater 
systems.114   
Summary 
Following the attacks of 9/11, many articles, reports, and books were 
published that highlighted areas of vulnerability and proposed ways to improve 
emergency management practices in large-scale disasters.  Those proposals included: 
providing better equipment and training to first responders; establishing clear SOPs 
(including roles and responsibilities) for the private sector and at the local, state, and 
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federal levels; and facilitating extensive coordination among different agencies, 
jurisdictions, and organizations in the private sector.   
Most of these recommendations came to light before the Northeast Blackout 
of 2003.  Chapter Two analyzes the lessons learned from this incident, the 
vulnerabilities that contributed to the flawed response to this emergency, and 
recommendations for future disasters.  This analysis helps to determine the extent to 
which recommendations from the response to 9/11 were implemented in emergency 
management plans within first responder agencies, the federal government, and the 
private sector.   
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
THE NORTHEAST BLACKOUT OF 2003:  
CHALLENGES REMAIN, SOME OLD, SOME NEW 
 
 
 
 
 On August 14, 2003, the United States experienced one of the most extensive 
blackouts in history, with power outages in eight Northeast states.  Areas of Canada 
were also involved. Overall, an estimated fifty million people were affected.115  
Although the power failure was not the act of terrorists, many security experts such as 
Stephen Flynn and Richard Clarke have postulated that an attack on critical 
infrastructure (such as the power grid) is a likely terrorist event.  For this reason, 
lessons from the blackout must be analyzed to determine how to prepare for another 
attack on our critical infrastructure and in turn enhance our homeland security 
policies.   
The first part of this chapter focuses on the response to the blackout in terms 
of the transportation sector, health care providers, emergency operations personnel 
and essential staff, the private sector, and communications.  The lessons of the 
terrorist attacks of 9/11 prompted first responders, government agencies, and the 
private sector in New York City to increase their emergency preparedness, which 
helped in the response to the blackout.   
The second part of the chapter analyzes the areas where improvements were 
made.  While there were steps taken to ensure a more effective response to a large-
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scale emergency, vulnerabilities still existed that hampered the response to the 
blackout.  The third part of the chapter focuses on those vulnerabilities. 
The chapter concludes with analysis of the recommendations made in the 
aftermath of the blackout to further improve emergency response.  Recommendations 
are focused on the transportation sector, health care providers, emergency operations 
centers, and the private sector, with emphasis on standard operating procedures, 
communications, and interagency coordination. 
Various reports were published that highlighted lessons of the blackout and 
recommended improvements in emergency response efforts.  The three main reports 
include: a report to New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg from the New York 
City Emergency Response Task Force, Enhancing New York City’s Emergency 
Preparedness; a report by the U.S. Department of Transportation, Effects of 
Catastrophic Events on Transportation System Management and Operations: New 
York City; and an article in the Association of Schools of Public Health, “Blackout of 
2003: Public Health Effects and Emergency Response.” Other sources include: a 
document entitled “Transit Security Design Considerations,” sponsored by the U.S. 
Department of Transportation; an article in Public Roads entitled “Learning from the 
2003 Blackout”; and testimony of the Greater New York Hospital Association.  In 
referring to the findings and recommendations of these various sources, the following 
designations will be used: “Preparedness Report” for Enhancing New York City’s 
Emergency Preparedness, “Transportation Report” for Effects of Catastrophic Events 
on Transportation System Management and Operations: New York City, “Public 
Health Report” for “Blackout of 2003: Public Health Effects and Emergency 
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Response,” “Public Roads Report” for “Learning from the 2003 Blackout,” and 
“Hospital Report” for the testimony of the Greater New York Hospital Association. 
 
Lessons for Domestic Security from the Northeast Blackout of 2003 
 
Some of the proposals for change in reports following the 9/11 attacks had 
been implemented by 2003.  They enabled New York City to better handle the 
domestic security problems posed by the massive blackout.  In addition, some of the 
problems that existed on 9/11 were resolved in the response to the Blackout.  
However, new problems emerged that had not previously been exposed.  They 
provided new lessons to further develop and improve emergency management 
practices in transportation, health care, emergency operations centers, the private 
sector, and communications infrastructure. 
 
Transportation 
 
 One of the most significant issues that plagued response efforts during the 
Blackout was the overwhelming volume of pedestrians, both New York residents and 
commuters from New Jersey, Connecticut, and other areas outside the city.  There 
were an estimated 2 million people in the city every day, and their exodus into the 
streets at the end of the workday on August 14, 2003 hampered response efforts.116  
Since public transportation was not operating due to the Blackout, there was heavy 
pedestrian traffic in the streets and on bridges, which slowed emergency vehicles 
from responding to incidents.     
                                                 
116 U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, Managing 
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The first lesson from the Blackout was that better evacuation plans and routes 
needed to be established.  This would not only help people get out of the city but 
would also help emergency vehicles in their response efforts and allow organizations 
and agencies providing assistance to transport resources and personnel.117   
The second lesson was that better SOPs for methods of transportation needed 
to be established so that all transportation agencies would have the same regulations 
in place during an emergency.  For example, some bus companies and ferry 
companies stopped charging fares, while others continued to do so.118  Standardizing 
these procedures would contribute to a more efficient evacuation. 
The third lesson was that a more effective system should be in place to 
manage traffic signals that lose their power source.  The lack of functioning traffic 
lights led to more congested streets and created difficulties for emergency vehicles.119  
This problem was exacerbated by the fact that none of the traffic signals had backup 
battery power.  While during the blackout civilians frequently took the initiative to 
direct traffic,120 they cannot be relied upon to do so in a large-scale emergency, 
especially in the event of a terrorist attack. 
The fourth lesson from the Blackout was that a more effective way to 
communicate with the public about transportation hubs should be established.121  
Many pedestrians were not aware of the locations from which buses were departing 
or what alternate methods of transportation were available.  Ensuring a better way to 
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disseminate this type of information would ease congestion and facilitate evacuation 
efforts. 
The last lesson of the Blackout was that traffic emergency operations centers 
needed to be better prepared to manage an emergency situation.  For example, 
emergency food and water supplies need to be available so that traffic personnel can 
work long hours.  Flashlights with updated batteries should be on hand so that when 
lights fail, traffic personnel can see down stairwells and other areas where light 
sources are not backed up with a generator, and charged batteries should be accessible 
for cell phones and other electronic devices.122 
 
Health 
 
 During the Blackout, hospitals ran generators to carry on operations.  Some 
generators did not perform as expected, which illustrated the importance of: health 
care facilities having adequate fuel to run their generators; properly maintaining 
mechanical parts of generators; and testing them regularly under a full load to ensure 
that they would function at full capacity in the event of an outage.   
 Ensuring that facilities that can be used to sterilize equipment and keep 
vaccinations and other medical supplies from spoiling are accessible during a 
blackout is imperative to maintain essential hospital functions and services.123  An 
additional important lesson was that facilities need to be in place to assist patients 
with non-emergency services in the event of an extensive power outage so that 
hospitals and other health care facilities are not overwhelmed but rather can focus 
their attention on patients in need of urgent medical care.   
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 During emergencies, hospitals use a syndromic surveillance system to track 
patient symptoms in order to determine if an infectious agent has been released by 
terrorists.  That system was unable to transfer important information to the 
Department of Health and Mental Hygiene during the Blackout.  The data that this 
system creates is only a helpful tool in emergency response efforts if it can be shared 
with key agencies and departments.  The Blackout demonstrated how vulnerable parts 
of this system are to failure.  Moreover, it showed how imperative it is to ensure that 
all components of the syndromic surveillance system are supported by backup power 
sources so that emergency responders and personnel can act on accurate information 
in a timely manner. 
 
Emergency operations center 
 
 Among the variety of command centers established to make policy decisions 
during an emergency (such as tactical command centers that manage emergency 
operations in coordination with first responder agencies, or the command center that 
the mayor and key political staff establish to make important policy decisions) the 
most important command center is the Emergency Operations Center (EOC).  During 
the Blackout, the EOC was organized by the New York City Office of Emergency 
Management.  Problems with that center indicated that EOC personnel and staff 
needed to better prepare for emergencies, especially those where power sources are 
compromised, in order to function at full capacity during an incident.124   
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Communications 
 
 The first lesson of the blackout was that better communication technology and 
systems need to be available to personnel.  In particular, traffic personnel must have 
reliable communications infrastructure in the event that large-scale evacuations are 
necessary.  Additionally, since traffic personnel are so often out in the field, improved 
ability to communicate could facilitate a smoother evacuation process.125   
 The second lesson was that a more effective technology infrastructure for 
emergency dispatchers was needed.  The emergency dispatch and communication 
system failed several times during the Blackout and was overwhelmed with 911 calls, 
which indicated the pressing need to implement better systems so that first responders 
can receive information and respond quickly to emergency calls. 
 In addition to providing better communications systems for first responders 
and necessary personnel, the crisis also demonstrated the need for a better backup 
system for public telecommunications facilities.  During the Blackout, citizens had 
difficulties placing calls, including 911 calls, because a Verizon facility was affected 
by the Blackout.  Since emergency management personnel also rely on cellular 
communications through private companies,126 ensuring that telecommunications 
companies have sufficient backup power is imperative.127 
 
Private sector 
 
 As mentioned earlier, the private sector owns and operates 85% of critical 
infrastructure in the U.S.  The Blackout was an illustrative event in that it 
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demonstrated how salient is role of the private sector in homeland security.  If the 
private sector does not do more to increase its ability to withstand an attack, whether 
an attack on physical infrastructure or a cyber attack, it will be increasingly 
vulnerable to terrorists.128   
Terrorists, however, are the not the only thing that can affect critical 
infrastructure.  Human error, as was evidenced by the Blackout, and severe weather 
events can also have disastrous impacts on critical infrastructure.  Resiliency, or the 
ability of the private sector to recover from large-scale failures, is paramount to 
ensuring long-term sustainability of our critical infrastructure. 
In addition to these lessons for the private sector, it was also apparent in the 
aftermath of the Blackout that the government needs to collaborate with the private 
sector.129  Since the private sector is primarily motivated by economic concern for the 
bottom line, the government must find a way to pressure the private sector to invest in 
critical infrastructure protection, by creating incentives and mandating higher 
government standards.130   
Areas of Improvement 
 
The lessons learned from 9/11 led to a very different outcome for first 
responders during the Northeast Blackout of 2003.  Their efforts were largely 
successful, avoiding the extensive confusion and chaos that characterized the 
response to 9/11.131,132  Other organizations were also able to learn from some of the 
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lessons of 9/11, which contributed to a more efficient and effective response to the 
Blackout.   
 
Standard operating procedures 
 
 As a result of 9/11, several SOPs were established prior to the Blackout.  For 
example, the staff at INFORM (INformation FOR Motorists) developed emergency 
operations plans in collaboration with other agencies, including the New York 
Department of Transportation Headquarters, Federal Highway Administration, and 
the Transportation Operations Coordinating Committee.  These emergency 
management plans had previously been activated during a hurricane, a major athletic 
event, and several practice drills, which contributed to their successful 
implementation during the Blackout.133  
 Emergency operating procedures that had been established after 9/11 for 
traffic patterns were also initiated during the Blackout. When the Blackout occurred, 
these procedures helped control the flow of vehicles into Manhattan by closing 
bridges and tunnels or restricting what vehicles could pass through.  This prevented 
even more motorists from adding to Manhattan’s serious traffic congestion.134 
 Procedures had also been established for the roles and responsibilities of 
specific personnel.  For example, managers from the Port Authority of New York and 
New Jersey reported to their respective emergency operations centers without being 
told because they were familiar with emergency procedures, and employees knew 
ahead of time who was responsible for opening an emergency operations center. 
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Similarly, NYPD police officers in the traffic division knew the intersections to 
which they should report in the event of an emergency.135  To aid emergency 
personnel in their response efforts, a 1-800 number had been created by NJ Transit 
and TRANSCOM so that key staff could pass on details of agency response plans and 
hold conference calls.136,137   
 The Department of Health and Mental Hygiene enhanced its emergency 
management practices following the events of 9/11 by implementing the Incident 
Management System.  This assisted with the Department’s response to the Blackout, 
as it facilitated effective communication, a unified command structure, and 
standardized procedures and terminology.138 
 Mutual-aid agreements had also been established by the Public Health 
Laboratory so that in the event of an emergency the Public Health Laboratory could 
rely on other laboratories when it needed additional assistance to carry out essential 
functions.  When some of the equipment failed to operate during the Blackout, the 
Laboratory was able to enlist the help of other laboratories that had agreed to provide 
backup assistance in advance.139    
 
Interagency coordination 
 
 One of the most serious problems that plagued response efforts to the 9/11 
attacks was the lack of interagency coordination.  In the years following 9/11, 
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interagency coordination improved greatly between various agencies in New York 
City.  It was facilitated by day-to-day operations, joint terrorism exercises, and other 
large-scale emergencies.140  
 Transportation agencies in particular became familiar with one another and 
developed relationships, which contributed substantially to the response efforts during 
the Blackout.  Since many of the transportation services crossed city and state 
boundaries, there was an extensive amount of regional collaboration, such as the 
efforts between the NYC MTA Bridges and Tunnels staff and the NYC Transit staff 
to evacuate citizens.141   
In addition, transportation agencies also reached out to other agencies that 
supported response efforts.  For example, transportation agencies had previously 
established agreements with private carrier companies, which were activated during 
the Blackout.142  Transportation departments also worked closely with emergency 
operations centers at the local and state level, and coordinated with law enforcement 
agencies, especially state and transit police forces.143   
Interagency coordination occurred on both the individual and institutional 
levels.144  Through day-to-day operations and exercises, personal relationships were 
established.  This made things easier when additional resources were needed because 
someone knew exactly whom to contact in another department to obtain those 
resources.145 
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Some interagency coordination has gone beyond public government agencies, 
expanding into the private and non-profit sector.  For example, the Greater New York 
Hospital Association established an Emergency Preparedness Coordinating Council 
in the months after 9/11 to coordinate with local and regional agencies and service 
providers to facilitate emergency planning.146 
 
Training and Exercises 
 
 Interagency coordination was facilitated through various interactions, 
including tabletop* and joint-terrorism exercises and training sessions.  Training, 
exercises, and real-life scenarios also contributed to preparedness initiatives, ensuring 
that first responders and emergency personnel knew what to do and how to perform 
their responsibilities during a large-scale emergency, and demonstrated areas that 
needed to be improved.147   
Since one of the lessons that emerged from the response to 9/11 was that the 
Incident Command System needed to be integrated into response efforts, the NJ 
Transit staff was trained in ICS during a train derailment.148  Tabletop exercises have 
also been valuable in developing best practices for emergency management.  Some of 
the tabletop exercises were small and local in scope, while others expanded across 
national borders and involved many different agencies.149 
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Another important component of emergency preparedness is training.  In the 
aftermath of 9/11, emergency management personnel, particularly those with transit 
agencies, received training so that they could perform their own jobs better in an 
emergency situation, and they were also cross-trained so that they could perform 
other employees’ jobs when the need arose.  Moreover, transit managers who are 
often in the field in an emergency received training so that they would be more 
effective decision makers in the event that communications technology was not 
functioning.150  
Employees with the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene participated in 
training and exercises to increase familiarity with the Incident Management System.  
This training helped them to understand what their role and section assignments 
would be in the event of an emergency.151  In addition, several agencies had run drills 
and participated in exercises to become more familiar with their emergency response 
plans so that evacuations and procedures were carried out effectively during an actual 
emergency.152  
Areas of Vulnerability 
 
New York City had experienced other outages in the past, most notably in 
1965 and 1977.  However, it had been a while since the city had to deal with an 
outage as extensive and long-lasting as the Northeast Blackout of 2003.  For this 
reason, many of the systems that had not previously been fully tested were found to 
be insufficient in a blackout that lasted more than a few hours.   
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Transportation 
 
 The New York City transportation system is one of the most extensive and 
most heavily traveled in the United States.153  In particular, the subway system is the 
largest, most complex system in the country.154  While the evacuation of the more 
than 400,000 subway riders155 was relatively smooth, problems occurred when those 
passengers needed other methods of transportation to reach their destinations.   
The two forms of public transportation that were not affected by the Blackout 
experienced their own difficulties.  The ferry system that connects Manhattan to ports 
in New Jersey and Brooklyn was overwhelmed with travelers on both the piers and 
the ferries themselves.156  Ferry services and some bus carriers lacked standardized 
regulations for what fares would be collected or what passes would be honored in an 
emergency situation.157  Bus services were overwhelmed as well by the unexpected 
influx of passengers who normally traveled by train daily as well as by people who 
had no other means of transportation.  Buses experienced additional problems 
because the traffic congestion was so extensive.  Problems were made worse by the 
failure of communications systems, which left the transit operations center to be 
unable to communicate directly with individual buses.158 
 These overcrowding problems were exacerbated by the lack of an effective 
means to communicate transportation information to travelers.  Public address 
systems to notify travelers of transportation options were in the buildings that had 
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been evacuated,159 and there were no other public address systems in place to 
disseminate accurate transportation information. 
 
Health 
 
 While all hospitals had generators, a few hospitals did not have a backup 
power source at the onset of the Blackout because their generators did not perform as 
expected during the blackout.  Additionally, some generators began to run low on fuel 
or experienced issues with mechanical equipment.160 
 During the Blackout it became apparent that patients who relied on electricity 
to power medical equipment needed a source of energy; in many cases these patients 
went to local hospitals in hopes that they would be able to provide some source of 
power.161  Hospitals and health care facilities were overwhelmed with these patients, 
as well as with patients who needed other non-emergency services, such as those 
needing prescriptions to be filled or those simply seeking shelter.162 
 The Blackout caused some breakdowns in the syndromic surveillance system 
that hospitals employed to track symptoms of patients to determine if an infectious 
agent had been released by terrorists.  While the main equipment functioned properly 
because it was backed up by generators, the system that transferred the data to other 
hospitals and the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene was not supported by the 
generator.  The information had to be collected manually and transmitted by 
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emergency personnel.163  This system was inefficient and would have proven 
disastrous if a terrorist attack had in fact occurred.     
 
Communications 
  
 Improving communications technology across all agencies was not a 
widespread initiative in the aftermath of 9/11; therefore, transportation agencies 
lacked sufficient communications abilities.  While older communications systems 
(such as fax machines and landlines) worked in operations centers,164 many of the 
transit personnel who worked in the field could only use hand-held walkie-talkies, 
which only worked as long as their batteries lasted.165  
Transportation agencies were not the only agencies that experienced 
difficulties with communication equipment.  While many agencies had developed 
emergency operations plans in the wake of 9/11, communications technology either 
failed or was not sustained long enough by battery power, hampering emergency 
response procedures. 
 First responders again had to manage the crisis despite failed communications 
infrastructure.  The 911 system did not work as intended because the telephone 
company had lost power.  Similarly, the FDNY could not operate its computerized 
tracking systems, so fire and EMS personnel had to be tracked manually.166   
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Furthermore, repeaters* could not function without a power system.167  Since there 
were no backup energy sources for these systems, or the batteries on which they 
relied did not last for the duration of the outage, the efforts of first responders and 
other emergency personnel were hampered. 
 Despite recommendations following 9/11 for improved communications 
abilities for first responders, including an increased bandwidth and interoperability of 
communications systems, those recommendations had not been implemented and 
caused problems for first responders during the Blackout.  While improved, 
communications between local, state, and federal agencies still encountered some 
difficulties, as well.168 
 Although some agencies had predetermined roles and responsibilities for 
personnel in emergency situations, not all agencies had such procedures in place.  For 
instance, instead of having emergency operations procedures, the Department of 
Health and Mental Hygiene relied on its call center for employees to obtain important 
information about the situation and their responsibilities.  Since the backup battery 
the call center used during outages was unable to maintain continuous backup power, 
the call center was not an effective means of communicating with employees.  
Additionally, the call center could not deal with the volume of calls it received 
because there were not enough landlines.169      
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Standard operating procedures 
 
While most agencies had emergency operations plans, some of them did not 
have plans that were fully developed, effective for a long-lasting blackout situation, 
or put into practice through drills and exercises.  This led to confusion over staff 
responsibilities during an incident since emergency personnel did not have 
predetermined roles.  For example, the EOC was not always sufficiently staffed, and 
the staff was not entirely familiar with emergency operations plans or other agencies.  
This was exacerbated by employees lacking official credentials, which slowed their 
ability to respond to an incident.  Additionally, command structures during the 
Blackout were not consistent, which caused information to be duplicated or not to be 
shared with staff who had to make important decisions that relied on accurate 
information.170 
Although more integrated emergency dispatch systems were recommended in 
the wake of 9/11, the City of New York had failed to address this issue.  Instead, fire, 
police, and EMS agencies followed separate protocols for 911 calls, which led to a 
more inefficient system to responding to calls for assistance.171  A more effective 
system for coordinating with each of the first responder agencies would facilitate 
more efficient response efforts.   
 
Recommendations 
 
 Some of the recommendations after the Blackout had previously been made in 
the wake of 9/11.  Most of the recommendations, however, were new in scope, not 
having been raised by key 9/11 reports.  While the Preparedness Report is the main 
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focus of this section because it focused entirely on recommendations, other reports 
provided recommendations that were either put forth in the Preparedness Report or 
were original recommendations, and therefore will be included when necessary. 
 
Transportation 
 
 The Preparedness Report offered several key recommendations for the 
transportation sector.  The first was that a more effective, efficient, and flexible 
transportation plan should be established and distributed more widely to the public.  
The plan should include specific regulations for pedestrians to facilitate the 
movement of emergency vehicles.  The Report suggested that this plan also include 
standardized, citywide protocols for collecting fares and honoring transit passes.172 
 In order to solve the overcrowding problem that occurred at many ferry docks 
and piers, the Preparedness Report recommended that New York City explore options 
for augmenting ferry services in the event of an emergency, and that any issues that 
arose with specific carriers or pier locations be resolved.  In order to achieve this, 
New York City should also create an inventory of all ferry resources that would be 
accessible during an incident, and should ensure that enough public safety personnel 
would be available to perform crowd control and maintain order.173   
 One of the main issues during the Blackout was the failure of traffic signals to 
operate, causing congestion and delaying emergency response vehicles.  The 
Preparedness Report recommended a few solutions.  One was to install backup power 
sources, particularly at critical intersections, including batteries, generators, or solar 
panels.  The second was to implement laws that require travelers to stop at all 
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intersections when the signals were not functioning due to a power outage.  The third 
proposal was to train people, either municipal employees or citizens, to direct traffic 
in the event that police officers were not able to perform their usual traffic duties.174  
To ensure that these signal systems can withstand a blackout, the Transportation 
Report recommended that city agencies take backup power and restoration needs of 
traffic signal equipment into consideration before investing in this equipment.175 
 To facilitate evacuation efforts, the Preparedness Report recommended that 
transportation centers should be identified so that citizens can find them and get 
accurate information about the means of transportation that are operating in an 
emergency situation.  The Report also recommended that New York City reach out to 
private carriers, such as taxis, limousines, and buses to plan for emergencies and 
determine how these companies can assist in an incident.176   
 The Hospital Report recommended that transportation policies include 
provisions for health care personnel.  This Report highlighted the importance of 
considering personnel from hospitals and nursing homes essential staff so that they 
can be included in certain citywide procedures and have access to transportation in 
the event of an emergency.177 
 
Health 
 
 Mass care facilities, such as hospitals and nursing homes, must sustain 
operations in an emergency situation to treat urgent medical needs.  During the 
Blackout, some hospitals ran into difficulties with generators malfunctioning or had 
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concerns about fuel levels to power the generators.  Therefore, the Preparedness 
Report recommended that standards for hospital generators be assessed and upgraded 
to ensure that hospitals can provide services (at full load capacity) through long-
lasting, extensive power outages.  Other essential care facilities, such as dialysis 
centers and blood banks, should also have sufficient backup power in place to support 
them during outages.  Further, the Report emphasized the need have emergency 
preparedness plans at care facilities, including adult homes and assisted living 
centers.178 
 Since hospitals and other medical facilities were overwhelmed with patients 
who needed non-emergency medical care or a power source for their medical 
equipment, the Preparedness Report proposed working with the private sector to 
establish comfort centers.  If agreements are made with the private sector to provide 
comfort centers that would help people with non-life threatening medical concerns, it 
would alleviate the pressure on hospitals freeing them from responding to less serious 
cases in order to focus on emergency conditions.179  The Hospital Report suggested 
that the city of New York provide these alternative care sites and shelters in future 
incidents to ease the demand on hospitals.   
 To ensure that vulnerable populations, such as the elderly, homebound, or 
disabled are cared for in an emergency, the Report suggested that the 311 telephone 
number of the Citizen Service Center could be utilized to respond to calls from people 
needing non-emergency assistance.  Additionally, outreach efforts should be 
continued to encourage citizens, especially vulnerable populations, to create 
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individual emergency preparedness plans, which could include contact information of 
individuals who could provide assistance to people with special needs, and plans to 
have backup supplies, such as medications, food, and water, on hand for emergency 
situations.180 
 While fortunately the Blackout did not last long enough to cause significant 
problems of getting water for residents of high-rise buildings, a longer incident would 
have required a system for distributing water to people stuck in apartment buildings.  
The Report suggested that plans for delivering water in such a situation should be 
evaluated and improved.181 
 
Emergency operations centers and city agencies 
 
 The Preparedness Report focused on ways to improve emergency operations 
and EOCs.  The first recommendation was to develop a more effective command 
structure to ensure that appropriate personnel are determined before an incident to 
lead emergency management operations.  This structure should include a way for 
EOCs to contact staff designated to lead in an incident, and procedures for how those 
commanders will respond in an emergency.  Establishing this structure will also help 
in obtaining resources to respond to an incident, including equipment and supplies to 
support the commanding officer’s decisions. 
 The second recommendation offered by the Preparedness Report to enhance 
EOC capabilities was that essential emergency staff should have predetermined roles 
and responsibilities so they know how to respond in an emergency.  Standard 
operating procedures should be developed to designate certain staff for key operating 
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functions, such as information technology or facilities management, to ensure that 
normal functions continue smoothly.  Moreover, these plans should be reinforced by 
training, drills, and exercises so that in a real emergency, personnel are familiar with 
any self-activating emergency plans and know what is expected of them.   
 The Preparedness Report also recommended that a process for providing 
credentials to essential staff must be implemented.  A system should also be 
developed that keeps a directory of essential staff, how they can be identified, and 
would include their credentials so that they could be allowed into an incident area and 
provide services.  In addition, a system to determine which staff would be best suited 
to respond during a particular disaster based on skill sets and abilities should be used 
in assigning response duties.  This system should include both essential and non-
essential emergency personnel.  Emergency operations centers should also have a 
directory of all personnel and ways to contact them in the event of an emergency.182 
 Some of the recommendations provided in the Public Health Report reflected 
those that were given in the Preparedness Report.  One such recommendation was 
that emergency protocols for city personnel be predetermined, including which 
employees should report to work, when and in what situations they should report, and 
where or to whom they should report.  In order to further enhance emergency 
operations, each city agency should have a secure and easily accessible directory of 
employees, along with contact information and each of the employee’s skill sets.  To 
ensure that these procedures work seamlessly in an emergency and that employees 
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understand what is expected of them in an incident, the Public Health Report also 
recommended that drills, exercises, and trainings be carried out and evaluated.183 
 The Transportation Report recommended that EOCs have sufficient supplies 
so that EOCs can operate during an emergency.184  These resources include supplies 
of water, power bars, and batteries to sustain personnel and emergency operations, 
and also generators, machinery, light towers, and fuel to assist other agencies and 
facilities, such as hospitals in their emergency response efforts.  The Public Health 
Report recommended further that these supplies be kept in a place that is accessible in 
an emergency, rather than a facility that is difficult to access or far away.185  
Procedures for sharing these resources with other agencies and neighboring 
jurisdictions should also be established.186  Furthermore, the Preparedness Report 
recommended that EOCs have a system in place that tracks the supply of these 
resources.187   
 The Public Roads Report emphasized the need for emergency operations 
centers and other city agencies to invest in initiatives that enhance redundancy.  The 
Report specified that agency personnel, communications, utilities, and control centers 
all have redundancy built into them.  Additionally, backup power should be available 
for things such as key door entry systems, air conditioning equipment, building 
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security systems, and sump pumps for areas that are prone to flooding, among 
others.188 
 
Standard operating procedures 
 
 While most agencies had emergency operations and evacuations plans in place 
before the Blackout, several had not established such procedures.  The Preparedness 
Report advised that all city agencies should have emergency and evacuation plans in 
place, and that drills and exercises should be carried out to test their effectiveness and 
ensure that employees are familiar with the plans.  Considerations the Report 
suggested agencies should keep in mind included shelter-in-place procedures, how 
disabled employees or other vulnerable populations will be evacuated in an incident, 
and what methods of transportation will be utilized in the event of an evacuation.189  
 The Transportation Report recommended that these plans should also include 
procedures in the event that an incident out lasts capabilities of backup power 
sources.190  Additionally, the Report recommended that plans be created that have 
procedures for recovery efforts after incidents occur.191   
 The Preparedness Report suggested that procedures for communicating with 
telecommunications providers during an incident be formalized, including 
notification when incidents occur and maintaining open lines of communication with 
city agencies during an emergency.192  
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Communications 
 
 The Preparedness Report recommended that the 911 system be assessed to 
identify areas of vulnerability.  Specifically, single points of failure should be 
addressed so that emergency communications between the public and first responder 
agencies can be maintained in a large-scale outage.  Moreover, dispatch and 
emergency communications systems should be assessed to determine how they can 
better facilitate incident command and centralized communications that coordinate 
the various emergency services agencies.193  The Report continued on to note the 
importance of incorporating systems that allow emergency dispatchers to track 
emergency vehicles and therefore assist with allocating resources and personnel.194 
 So that telecommunications services continue in the event of a power outage, 
the Public Roads Report recommended that New York City, its emergency response 
agencies, and private sector entities related to homeland security issues or emergency 
management join the federally funded Government Emergency Telecommunications 
Service and Wireless Priority Service so that pre-approved users are prioritized in an 
incident.  These systems operate even under periods of high demand and can support 
both landline and wireless calls.195   
 In order to facilitate sharing important information with the public in 
emergency situations, the Preparedness Report recommended that the New York City 
Hall press office centralize communications to the public, rather than the Office of 
Emergency Management handling this responsibility.  Additionally, the Report noted 
the communications systems that are already in place, such as the 311 Citizen Service 
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Center, should be used to disseminate information to the public.196  These systems, as 
the Report pointed out, would assist New York City in communicating with city 
employees as well as businesses.197  To facilitate communications with the public in 
the event of a power outage, the Public Health Report suggested that press releases 
and public health advisories on basic health issues that are expected from certain 
types of emergencies be prepared ahead of time to avoid delays if computer systems 
are down.198  The Transportation Report emphasized the importance of disseminating 
information to the public, and recommended that relationships with the media and 
other sources of information be established, in addition to communication procedures 
and strategies.199 
 The Transportation Report highlighted the importance of city agencies, 
especially transportation agencies, obtaining sufficient communications equipment 
and using up-to-date communications technology.  Additionally, the Report 
recommended that agencies establish noncommunications (NonComm) plans* and 
perform exercises to identify weaknesses in NonComm plans.200  The Public Roads 
Report echoed this recommendation, suggesting that personnel in emergency 
operations centers and other response agencies should have specific drills that test 
NonComm procedures.201  The Transportation Report further recommended that 
agencies should have both older equipment, such as landlines, and newer 
communications technologies available for an emergency to ensure continued 
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operation.202  Lastly, agencies should have backup power for communications 
systems, such as batteries or generators.203 
 The Public Health Report recommended that the EOC in particular have better 
communications abilities by acquiring telephones that do not need additional power 
to operate so that lines of communication remain open and functioning.204  The 
Hospital Report focused on having an effective communications system in place so 
that health information, such as locations of hospitals, shelters, and other care centers, 
could be disseminated to the public.  This Report also emphasized the importance of 
informing the public not to go to hospitals unless they need urgent medical care.205 
 
Infrastructure 
 
 One of the most pressing issues for emergency response operations during the 
Blackout was the need for backup energy sources.  The Preparedness Report 
recommended that backup generators and batteries be maintained properly, which 
includes having adequate fuel reserves, and that new installations should abide by 
basic equipment standards.  In addition, tests and evaluations of these backup energy 
sources should be performed regularly to ensure that they are able to withstand a full 
load in the event of a large-scale, long-lasting outage.206  The Transportation Report 
recommended that city agencies have backup power sources at off-site facilities so 
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that in the event of an extended power outage or if other backup systems fail, 
operations can continue.207 
 Since there was such a large demand on fuel reserves to power different 
facilities and equipment during the Blackout, the Preparedness Report recommended 
that New York City update its fuel management plan.  Revisions should take into 
account what agencies and facilities would be prioritized to receive fuel in an 
incident, as well as SOPs for working with multiple agencies and the private sector in 
delivering fuel supplies.208  The Public Health Report recommended that the EOC in 
particular invest in measures that would ensure full capacity operations in the event of 
a long-lasting outage, including backup generators and batteries.   
 In order to ensure that critical services such as hospitals and nursing homes 
can continue to operate in the event of a power failure, the Hospital Report 
recommended that hospitals and other care facilities be given priority when power 
grids are being restored, rather than restoring them grid by grid.209 
 
Interagency coordination 
 
  The Transportation Report recommended that city agencies establish formal 
agreements with other agencies and jurisdictions so that in an emergency situation 
clear chain-of-command structures and responsibilities for agencies and their 
employees are predetermined to enhance response efforts.  Since command structures 
often differ between agencies and jurisdictions, ensuring that the same type of 
command structure is employed and identifying which personnel have authority 
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ahead of time will make emergency operations run more smoothly.210  To facilitate 
this cooperation, the Report recommended that mutual aid agreements be created with 
neighboring jurisdictions and partner agencies.211 
In addition to establishing formal cooperative relationships with agencies, the 
Transportation Report recommended that employees of city agencies develop 
personal relationships with their counterparts in other departments so that in the event 
of an emergency, employees know whom to contact in other agencies and 
jurisdictions to facilitate response efforts.212  The last recommendation that the 
Transportation Report put forth was that emergency planning and cooperation efforts 
should have a regional component so that agencies and jurisdictions that do not often 
work together can operate seamlessly.213 
The Preparedness Report proposed that traffic information be centralized into 
one Joint Traffic Operation Center.  This way, all information would be in one place 
and the more than 20 agencies that coordinate traffic operations in the New York City 
metropolitan area would be able to easily locate important updates and would 
encourage information sharing and interagency coordination.214 
Efforts to strengthen communications abilities should be coordinated at the 
city level so that resources are used more effectively and efforts are more 
consolidated.  In evaluating citywide communications systems, the Preparedness 
Report recommended focusing on enhancing the citywide channels, installing backup 
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power sources for repeaters, and expanding the radio spectrum to facilitate systems 
such as emergency vehicle location capabilities.215 
To ensure that effective coordination continues, the Public Roads Report 
recommended that interagency coordination be assessed periodically, particularly 
after an incident occurs, to determine how relationships between organizations can be 
strengthened.216 
 
Private sector 
 
 The Report advised that New York City should provide better information to 
business owners during an emergency.  This process would be facilitated if 
representatives from the private sector were present at the EOC and therefore had 
direct access to important updates that they could then pass on to their private sector 
counterparts. 
 A second recommendation for the private sector that the Preparedness Report 
offered was that New York City should engage in more effective outreach efforts to 
get employees prepared to respond in an emergency.  Most notably, the Report 
suggested that the City provide guidance on how employees can create an emergency 
kit and what supplies should be included. 
  To better facilitate evacuation efforts, the Preparedness Report suggested that 
commercial and residential buildings should be revised to reflect best practices.  For 
example, buildings should have generators in the event that there is a power outage, 
sufficient lighting in stairwells, and systems to communicate with residents or 
employees during an outage. 
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 Since a majority of the critical infrastructure in the U.S. is owned and 
operated by the private sector, it has an important role to play in ensuring that critical 
infrastructure is protected in an emergency situation and that it can recover quickly 
with little damage.  The Preparedness Report singled out communications providers 
in its recommendations, advising that companies such as Verizon evaluate their 
backup power capabilities.  Companies that provide communications services to 
emergency operations personnel or agencies were also identified in the Report as 
companies that should assess generators and batteries to ensure that systems will 
continue to operate in a power failure.217  In order to facilitate maintaining emergency 
communications capabilities during an incident, the Report suggested using public-
private initiatives, particularly with smaller communications companies.218 
 
Summary 
Even though the Northeast Blackout of 2003 was not an act of terrorism, it 
illustrated ways in which the U.S. would be vulnerable to a terrorist attack of this 
type.  While the response to the Blackout improved in some of the areas that 
experienced problems in the response to 9/11, new vulnerabilities impacted response 
efforts.   Additionally, while the terrorist attacks of 2001 were a significant event and 
caused many issues, this chapter has shown how, in many ways, the Blackout was a 
more complex incident.  The next chapter will take the lessons from 9/11 and the 
blackout to determine how much Connecticut has improved its emergency 
management practices. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
CONNECTICUT: READY FOR A LARGE-SCALE EMERGENCY? 
 
 
 
 
 
Officials responsible for emergency management or homeland security have 
learned a great deal from the terrorist attacks of September 11th and the Northeast 
Blackout of 2003.  Nonetheless problems remain.  A case study of an exercise in 
emergency management illustrates ways in which homeland security has improved 
and areas needing further work.  This chapter analyzes the third simulated Top 
Officials exercise (TOPOFF) to determine how well the State of Connecticut has 
adopted recommendations for emergency management in the years following 9/11 
and the Blackout.  It identifies the areas of improvement and vulnerability in recent 
years in Connecticut, collected from a variety of sources, including several interviews 
with first responders.  The chapter concludes with recommendations for enhancing 
emergency management. 
 
TOPOFF 3 
 
 From April 4-8 2005, the TOPOFF 3 exercise was held in New London, 
Connecticut, two counties in New Jersey, and jurisdictions in Canada and the United 
Kingdom.  TOPOFF exercises were mandated by Congress to occur every other year 
in different parts of the United States to test counter-terrorism preparedness and 
response efforts and gain meaningful insight into where vulnerabilities exist.219  The 
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overall exercise involved more than 10,000 participants from more than 200 agencies 
at the federal, state, local, and tribal levels, in addition to international and volunteer 
organizations and representatives from the private sector220; the exercise in 
Connecticut alone involved more than 100 agencies, organizations, and localities.221  
The objective of this exercise was to evaluate the ability for these various agencies to 
effectively respond to two simultaneous terrorist attacks.  The simulation’s real-life 
components provided a way for the agencies to gain practical experience that was 
relevant to potential threats.222 
 The scenario in New London was a simulated attack involving the release of 
mustard gas and a high-yield explosive.  The exercise included components from 
several of the National Planning Scenarios, including the blister agent scenario and 
the explosives attack-bombing using improvised explosive device scenario.  The 
National Planning Scenarios were developed to assist local, state, and federal 
agencies in their preparation processes.223  Many different agencies and organizations 
were involved in the exercise, including the U.S. Coast Guard, the Connecticut 
National Guard, the University of Connecticut, federal, state, and local agencies 
including local fire, law enforcement, and EMS, two tribal nations, local hospitals and 
health departments, and various private sector companies.  The Department of 
Homeland Security’s website provided this overview of the exercise: 
Over the course of several days fire personnel  
conducted search and rescue, hospitals treated the 
injured (played by role players), subject-matter 
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experts analyzed the effects of the attack on public 
health, and top officials deployed resources and made 
the difficult decisions needed to save lives…An internal 
Virtual News Network (VNN) and news website  
provided real-time reporting of the story like an actual 
TV network would. The mock media kept players up-
to-date on unfolding events and enabled decision 
makers to face the challenge of dealing with the real 
world media.224 
 
Since so many organizations were involved in the planning and implementation 
process, many of which had different priorities or interests, this exercise served as a 
good test of their ability to communicate effectively and coordinate emergency 
response efforts.  These agencies collaborated to establish seven overarching 
objectives for the exercise: examine interoperability of communications, examining 
State’s incident management structure to determine the degree to which it follows the 
National Incident Management System; evaluate regional emergency response teams 
and procedures; test the ability of intelligence agencies to share information; examine 
the degree to which effective risk communication is carried out through interagency 
media and public information systems and procedures; assess the ability of the State’s 
behavioral healthcare system to assist with psychological trauma and procedures in 
providing first aid assistance to victims needing crisis counseling; and evaluate 
continuity of operations plans for the private sector.225 
 
UConn After-Action Report findings 
  
  The University of Connecticut (UConn) After-Action Report, published in 
January 2006, provided some insight into areas where vulnerabilities existed in the 
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response efforts.  In particular, it considered how to improve upon the objectives that 
had been previously determined for the exercise.  Moreover, it provided 
recommendations to enhance response capabilities. 
 The first vulnerability the Report identified occurred in the area of incident 
management.  During the exercise emergency response was hindered by confusion or 
which entity had authority: the Incident Command Center, the Joint Field Office*, or 
the State and Local Emergency Operations Centers.  There was also confusion about 
how information should be shared among them.  While the presence of liaison 
officers enhanced information sharing, the Report emphasized the importance of 
those officers having appropriate levels of clearance.  The process to obtain clearance 
is often lengthy, and in the event of an emergency, the process should be streamlined 
so that local, state, and private sector representatives can have access to critical 
information that would facilitate more informed decision-making in an emergency.  
The Report also noted that it was crucial to have the private sector represented in the 
Incident Management System.  To remedy the issues experienced with incident 
management, the Report recommended further drills, tabletop exercises, and training 
in NIMS, ICS, and the National Response Framework so that first responders, state 
and local officials, public health communities, and members of the private sector 
could better understand their roles and responsibilities in an emergency.226  
 Issues with information and intelligence sharing also came to light during the 
exercise.  The Report recommended that communications technology in the Joint 
Field Office be improved and that the process for obtaining security clearances and 
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declassifying information be more expedient and efficient.  To enhance dissemination 
of information to the public, the Report recommended that the Joint Information 
Center (JIC) be the only point of contact for media releases and that all information 
should be passed on to the JIC to streamline information sharing.  The Report also 
found that information sharing would be enhanced if more personnel received 
training on operating the communications equipment.  Although preexisting 
communications equipment seemed sufficient, personnel were not familiar with the 
emergency communications systems.227 
 The Report offered several recommendations relating to public health issues 
that surfaced during the exercise.  The first was that a Psychological First Aid and 
Crisis Counseling Center should be established immediately after a disaster occurs as 
a way to get bystanders or victims who do not need urgent medical attention away 
from the incident site.  In the event that individuals need to undergo decontamination, 
the Report suggested that the Department of Public Health, as well as other public 
health agencies and organizations, be available throughout the decontamination 
process.  One phenomenon that is prevalent at incidents is the ‘worried well.’  These 
are people who do not actually need urgent medical care but believe they might need 
to be treated.   They divert attention away from those who do need urgent medical 
care.  To remedy this problem, the Report recommended that procedures for 
screening and treating these ‘worried well’ be developed so that health care personnel 
can focus on patients with serious medical concerns.  Since the scenario was a 
simulated chemical attack, one lesson learned was that hospitals need to be more 
prepared to deal with the public health consequences of such an attack.  For example, 
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health care personnel should receive training on how to operate decontamination 
equipment.  Additionally, a tracking system and set of protocols should be developed 
to monitor patients, and standard operating procedures should be implemented to 
determine if and how potentially affected staff should be allowed back into health 
care facilities.228   
 The last area addressed in the Report’s findings was that of business 
continuity and the involvement of the private sector.  The Report recommended that 
procedures for private sector representation in the EOC should be formalized and that 
private sector officials should be involved with emergency preparedness training and 
domestic response initiatives.  These efforts could be supported by having the private 
sector and non-governmental organizations collaborate with communities to 
determine where shelters should be located, how they should be run, and what 
community resources would be necessary in an incident.  Lastly, since the private 
sector accounts for 85% of critical infrastructure in the U.S., the Report 
recommended more substantial efforts should be made to evaluate critical 
infrastructure, conduct exercises, ensure backup systems, and identify single points of 
failure that could be addressed in redundancy efforts.229  
 
Areas of Improvement 
 
The State of Connecticut has made advances in its emergency management 
practices and has implemented initiatives to give more resources to first responders.  
The following section highlights these improvements for first responders, mutual aid 
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and regional cooperation, public outreach efforts, training and exercises, and the 
private sector and critical infrastructure protection.  
 
First responders 
 
 In 2005, Governor Rell signed a directive that made the National Incident 
Management System (NIMS) the standard system used by first responders in 
responding to domestic incidents and emergency situations.  That enabled 
municipalities to qualify for federal grants.  In order to facilitate incorporating this 
system into the practices of response agencies, the Connecticut Department of 
Emergency Management and Homeland Security (CT DEMHS) established five 
regions and an implementation plan to effectively coordinate and execute planning, 
training, and response efforts. 
 A one-channel analog simulcast system, called the Connecticut Statewide 
Police Emergency Radio Network was launched in 2008, which provided 
interoperability for law enforcement agencies across the state.  This network can be 
used with stationary and mobile communications units and provides 97% coverage of 
mobile communications systems throughout Connecticut.230   
 In order to improve communications capabilities, the CT DEMHS has 
provided guidance on how to operate a very high frequency (VHF) radio system, 
which is used to facilitate communications between all the municipalities in 
Connecticut.  This system has five different radio frequencies, each of which is 
designated to a CT DEMHS region.   
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The ICALL/ITAC system* has also been implemented and expanded with the 
deployment of more than 1,100 portable 800 MHz radios to emergency response 
command staff such as fire and police chiefs and local emergency managers.  These 
radios provide crucial interoperability for essential command staff during incidents in 
Connecticut.  This program has also been supported by the statewide distribution of 
Statewide Tactical On-Site Communications boxes.231  Another system that has been 
utilized in Connecticut is the State Tactical on Scene Channel, which provides radio 
communications interoperability at an incident through already existing radio 
technology.232 
 Even though non-traditional first responders do not have to be NIMS or ICS 
compliant, the CT DEMHS provided trainings and seminars in NIMS and ICS from 
2007 to 2008.  Training and distance learning components have also been utilized by 
the CT DEMHS to increase the number of traditional first responders such as police, 
fire, and EMS with NIMS training.  This enables the individuals invited to receive 
such training without increasing the financial burdens already borne by local first 
responder agencies.233   
 To further support interoperability in communications, the State 
Communications Interoperability Plan (SCIP) was established in 2007, which 
includes strategies for improving communications interoperability in the short and 
long term.  Additionally, the Tactical Interoperability Communications Plan was 
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developed for each of the five regions.  This plan lays out the procedures for how 
communications will be carried on in an incident now rather than in the long term.234  
These plans are supported by the Interoperable Emergency Communications Grant 
Program, which also provides funding for developing procedures for these systems as 
well as performing training in their operations.235  The Communications Unit Leaders 
are another component of the SCIP.  They are trained personnel who assist the 
incident commander in setting up communications systems that support command 
and control and interoperability functions during response efforts.236 
 The Housatonic Valley Planning Region provides a specific example of where 
improvements have been made.  Along with training and drills to improve emergency 
preparedness and response, the region has taken additional steps to enhance its ability 
to respond in an incident.  For example, activities to support a hazardous materials 
(hazmat) response team for the area have been implemented, and new 
videoconferencing equipment was installed in 2004.  This aides command staff 
during incidents and provides images of incidents and maps to enhance coordination 
between different jurisdictions or agencies.237 
 In terms of providing urgent medical care to victims of emergencies, the State 
of Connecticut has purchased a mobile hospital with a 100-patient capacity.  This 
facility could be deployed to any part of Connecticut and could be assembled without 
much notice.  Personnel from the Connecticut Medical Assistance Team, the group 
that would staff the mobile hospital in an incident, have received training so that they 
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are familiar with the facility and can use it effectively.  This team has also been 
specifically trained to know how to respond to and use equipment for a contamination 
incident.238 
 
Mutual aid and regional cooperation 
 
 From 2008-2009, the CT DEMHS helped create Regional Emergency 
Planning Teams (REPTs).  These teams enhance regional cooperation efforts in each 
of the five regions and are comprised of personnel from multiple jurisdictions and 
agencies.  They have been a key component in leading needs-assessments in their 
regions and developing a regional emergency operations plan.239  Furthermore, the 
CT DEMHS is collaborating with these teams, as well as with regional planning 
organizations, to establish procedures between the five regions to support regional 
resource sharing, communications, and emergency service coordination during an 
incident.240 
 The Connecticut Department of Public Health has also encouraged regional 
cooperation in recent years.  In 2006, ten municipalities signed a regional mutual aid 
agreement to be used during a public health emergency.  This is intended to ensure 
that if one city or town is overwhelmed by the demand on health facilities, supplies, 
or personnel, procedures are in place for other localities to contribute to response 
efforts.241 
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Public concerns 
  
 From 2005-2006, the CT DEMHS made extensive efforts to educate the 
public about emergency preparedness.  These efforts included presentations by top 
officials in the CT DEMHS, informational brochures placed in major newspapers 
throughout the state, and a public education campaign focused on emergency 
preparedness and issues related to terrorism.242 
 In 2005, the CT DEMHS partnered with the statewide public affairs network 
to provide broadcasts of emergency operations centers during emergencies.  This 
initiative provides an outlet for the public to receive accurate and up-to-date 
information during an incident.243  Public education efforts were continued in 2006 
and 2007 with public service announcements on radio and television stations, 
messages on buses and trains, and an outreach campaign to children on a popular 
children’s television channel.244  From 2007 to 2008 more public announcement 
campaigns were undertaken through various media outlets to reach diverse parts of 
the population, including people for whom Spanish is the primary language.  In 
addition to the standard newspaper, radio, and television ad campaigns that had been 
used in the past, Internet advertisements were also utilized to raise emergency 
preparedness awareness. 
 Some residents in Connecticut are particularly at risk of potential exposure to 
hazmat due to their close proximity to the Millstone Nuclear Power Plant in 
Waterford, CT.  Public education events were organized from 2006 to 2007 to notify 
residents of the risk and to provide information on how to prepare for a radiological 
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threat.  Meetings with representatives from the plant and from the surrounding 
communities were held to discuss potential issues and questions raised by local 
residents.   
 The CT DEMHS worked with the National Weather Service and the CT 
Department of Education in 2007 and 2008 to install public alert radios in all the 
public schools in Connecticut so that schools can receive accurate and up-to-date 
information on severe weather threats.245  In 2008 and 2009, the CT DEMHS 
contributed to the development and installation of a statewide Emergency 
Notification System, which would disseminate information through an Internet based 
system to Connecticut citizens in the event of an emergency.246  Additionally, the 
City of New Haven has developed a system that would send warning messages to 
citizens, via phone or email, about severe weather threats.247 
 
Training and exercises 
 
 Since the Northeast Blackout of 2003, various drills and exercises have been 
executed in Connecticut to test the State’s ability to respond to an emergency.  Some 
of these activities are specific to threats that exist in Connecticut, such as radiological 
plume release drills in the communities neighboring the Millstone Nuclear Power 
Plant, which took place every year from at least 2004 to 2007.  Others are more 
general in scope, such as tabletop exercises and continuity of operations tests for a 
pandemic influenza event, hurricane and winter storm drills and tabletop exercises, 
and a Strategic National Stockpile drill.   
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Some of the exercises focused on the ability of an area to respond effectively 
to an incident.  Host community drills occurred in the Storrs/Mansfield and the 
Norwich areas between 2004 and 2007.248  Two other examples of regional drills 
occurred when the Housatonic Valley Planning Region conducted a hazmat drill in 
2006 and a pandemic drill in 2008 using the region’s new mobile field hospital.249  
Smaller scale exercises like these happen frequently throughout the State of 
Connecticut to ensure that municipalities or certain regions can respond effectively to 
an incident. 
 In 2007, an exercise was conducted to test the state’s newly developed 
continuity of operations plans.  In that same year, the Urban Search and Rescue Team 
participated in training to enhance their ability to respond to heavy vehicle and 
machinery incidents and to effectively employ the Incident Command System.  
Furthermore, the Urban Search and Rescue Team was involved with an exercise that 
tested their ability to respond to a building collapse that was followed by a hazmat 
explosion.250  The CT DEMHS also participated in a nationwide drill in 2006 to test 
preparedness for a major hurricane.251 
 
Emergency operations centers and the CT DEMHS 
 
 In 2006, Homeland Security grant funds helped establish the municipal high 
band radio initiative, which provides communications capabilities between 
municipalities and CT DEMHS regional offices.  HAM radios were also deployed at 
each of the five regional offices to facilitate information sharing during an incident. 
                                                 
248 http://www.ct.gov/dds/cwp/view.asp?a=12&q=393460 
249 Housatonic Valley Council of Elected Officials. 
250 DEMHS (2006/2007). 
251 DEMHS (2005/2006). 
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 To assist with flood mitigation planning, evacuation planning, and debris 
removal, the first phase of implementing a Geographic Information System began in 
2006.  This type of system can produce detailed maps that can provide important 
information to emergency managers following an emergency and can support 
response efforts.  This initiative is further enhanced with the new Geospatial lab that 
was added to the EOC and GIS experts volunteered to assist with GIS data collection 
and analysis during drills, exercises, and real life incidents.252 
 In 2008, the CT DEMHS established a WebEOC application, which facilitates 
information sharing and communications for emergency managers during response 
and recovery efforts through the Internet.  Training was also provided to all CT 
DEMHS employees as well as personnel with local emergency management agencies 
and the private sector.253 
 
Private sector and critical infrastructure protection (CIP) 
 
 A Critical Infrastructure Unit was established in 2005 to assist with efforts to 
protect critical infrastructure in the state.  As of 2006, the Critical Infrastructure Unit 
has brought in $850,000 in grants to support CIP initiatives.  One initiative aims to 
improve the ability of local law enforcement agencies by providing physical 
protection and security for infrastructure that has been identified as “critical” by the 
Department of Homeland Security.  Additionally, risk assessments of critical 
infrastructure have been conducted by this unit, including security assessments of 
                                                 
252 DEMHS (2006/2007). 
253 DEMHS (2008/2009). 
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certain transportation sites such as port, rail lines254 and bus depots, which have 
provided guidance on what areas should be improved.255 
 In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, which struck Louisiana and Mississippi in 
2005, debris was left all over the coastlines and took months to clear.  To prevent this 
problem from becoming a reality in Connecticut in the event of a major hurricane, the 
State has entered into contracts with companies that provide debris removal services 
in the event of a hurricane or other severe weather incident.256 
 
Evacuation and mass care sheltering 
 
 Planning for evacuation procedures and sheltering/mass care facilities began 
in late 2005 and resulted in a Regional Evacuation and Shelter Guide for emergency 
managers.  These guides provide information on shelter locations and evacuation 
routes.  The CT DEMHS coordinated with several other agencies and groups to 
ensure that there would be universal access to shelters in an emergency.  Such 
facilities would be preplanned, adequately equipped and operated to support a large 
group of people, including persons with disabilities or older adults.257  To facilitate 
evacuation planning, the Connecticut Department of Transportation has acquired GIS 
programming and is working on an inventory of important traffic information such as 
speed limits, road capacities, and underpass measurements.258 
 From 2006 to 2007, the CT DEMHS provided local emergency managers with 
information on how to establish Local Distribution Points (LDPs).  These are sites 
                                                 
254 DEMHS (2006/2007). 
255 DEMHS (2005/2006). 
256 Silverman, The New York Times. 
257 DEMHS (2006/2007). 
258 Minutes, Local Emergency Planning Commission, Wolcott, CT, January 19, 2009, 
http://www.wolcottct.org/detail.cfm?&sid=19&nid=332. 
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where FEMA supplies such as food, water, and tents can be distributed to citizens in 
the event of an emergency.  To facilitate this process, CT DEMHS drafted a 
Commodities Distribution Standard Operating Procedure for emergency managers, 
which gives further guidance on how FEMA supplies should be requested and 
procedures for how to handle and distribute the supplies once they are received.259 
 One example of an evacuation plan that has been established was developed 
by Fairfield County.  In the event that an evacuation order is declared for a major 
hurricane, the Merritt Parkway and I-95 would have all lanes going north to ease 
traffic congestion.  Procedures for bus transportation have also been included in these 
hurricane evacuation plans.  In New Haven, for instance, school bus drivers have 
been contracted to assist with evacuating citizens in the event of a hurricane or major 
weather event.260   
 The City of New Haven has determined recently constructed schools where 
shelters could be established that have backup power from generators and food 
vending companies that would be willing to contribute food in an emergency.  To 
ensure that persons in New Haven with disabilities or special needs are evacuated, a 
directory of these citizens has been created so that they may be assisted during an 
evacuation. 261 
Personal Accounts from First Responders 
 
 While there has been significant progress made in Connecticut, particularly 
for first responders, there are still areas where vulnerabilities remain.  Interviews were 
conducted with two fire fighters and one police officer to identify some of the 
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challenges that first responders face across the State, as well as improvements that 
have been made. 
The first interview was conducted with a Fire Inspector/Firefighter with the 
Mohegan Tribal Fire Department (MTFD) on April 11, 2010.  The second interview 
was with a volunteer Fire Captain with the Southbury Fire Department (SFD) on 
April 11, 2010.  The third interview was with a Sergeant with the New Haven Police 
Department (NHPD) on April 21, 2010.  The interviews lasted from 30 minutes to an 
hour and were conducted both in person and on the phone. 
 
Communications 
  
 While there have been advances in communications technology, there are 
considerable differences among the three first responder departments whose members 
were interviewed in terms of the extent to which communications systems have been 
updated to support interoperability.  The MTFD has obtained portable radios from 
other departments but this system has not worked well.  Rather than using the existing 
radio system to contact other departments, the MTFD has one radio for each 
department that they must use to get in touch with separate departments.  For 
example, the MTFD has one radio to contact the Norwich Fire Department, one radio 
to contact the Groton Fire Department, and so on.  This is an inefficient system and 
would cause major gaps in communication if a large-scale emergency requiring 
extensive interagency coordination ever occurred.  There is a system in place called 
VOIP (voice over Internet providers) that has been demonstrated at training sessions, 
which will allow patching of communications between different departments.  
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However, in the event of a power outage or technology failure, communications 
would not be supported since this system operates through the Internet.   
 For the SFD, upgrades have been implemented but problems still remain in 
contacting other people.  For example, more space is available to use on the radio 
spectrum, creating more channels, but there are still glitches with the high-band 
system that was recently installed.  Overall, interoperability in the area has improved 
significantly since 9/11, and officers can talk to each other when an incident occurs 
and requires response of various agencies and departments.  
 There is a scan channel on which the NHPD can call neighboring police 
departments.  This scan channel also allows NHPD officers to monitor the New 
Haven Fire Department and ambulance services in the city, but does not allow them 
to monitor neighboring communities’ EMS or fire services.  The NHPD has also 
begun installing the equipment that supports the Connecticut Statewide Police 
Emergency Radio Network in patrol cars, but it is not a department-wide resource 
yet.  This system has given the NHPD better communications ability with 
jurisdictions that are not supported by the scan channel (in other words, with 
jurisdictions that do not neighbor New Haven), although it could be streamlined even 
more.  As it operates now, the Connecticut State Police runs the system, and local 
departments must go through the State Police in order to contact other departments.  
 
Interagency coordination and mutual aid agreements 
 
 According to the Fire Inspector from the MTFD, tensions still exist, and 
several agencies are territorial when responding to an incident.  However, interagency 
training and information sharing has improved in the area.  Other departments have 
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toured the MTFD facility and attended trainings to become familiar with the 
resources the MTFD has and can contribute when mutual aid is necessary; these 
activities have been helpful to determine where gaps in resources and training, 
particularly with specialty training, exist.  While certain departments and personnel 
have become familiar with MTFD resources, this knowledge has yet to be fully 
translated into mutual aid agreements or passed on to other departments that have not 
participated in tours or training sessions.  Cross training has occurred with other 
departments, although, in various emergency management practices; for instance, the 
MTFD received training about its command structure from the Norwich Fire 
Department.  Furthermore, the local Incident Management Team, comprised of chiefs 
from various departments, has received specialized training to support the incident 
commander during an emergency.  Training is also conducted with the MTFD and 
local EMS for special response situations, such as confined spaces.  Hazmat and 
radiation exercises are conducted with first responders from the sub base in Groton, 
as well.   
 While some tension exists between the SFD or other local fire departments 
and local police departments, interagency coordination is relatively effective.  
Training is conducted as frequently as possible, and there are efforts to learn about 
the different resources of other departments.  In the event that mutual aid is required, 
an officer from the SFD will contact a dispatcher to tell him or her what resources are 
needed and the dispatcher will locate those resources and dispatch other departments 
to the scene.  However, while training between different departments and agencies 
has been implemented, regional drills and exercises have been not conducted.     
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 The NHPD participates in mutual aid regularly with day-to-day events and 
also coordinates with the State Police when additional assistance is needed.  Although 
interagency training occurs with specialized units such as the Bomb Squad and 
SWAT teams, there is no department-wide training with other departments or 
agencies.   
 
Standard Operating Procedures 
 
 The Fire Inspector explained some of the challenges that the MTFD and local 
fire departments still experience during an incident in regard to SOPs.  One such 
vulnerability is that SOPs for unassigned personnel have yet to be fully established.  
This leads to a lack of accountability when unassigned personnel arrive at scenes in 
their personal vehicles and fail to report to a staging area to receive important 
information.  Additionally, different credentialing protocols cause confusion when 
multiple jurisdictions respond to an incident.  There are emergency operations plans 
in place, however, that define roles and responsibilities for casino personnel (in 
addition to members of the MTFD) and an evacuation plan has been developed for 
each department in the Mohegan Casino to assist the MTFD in evacuating guests.  
The MTFD has implemented ICS, but issues still remain with plain language and 
standardized terminology.  Vehicle identification has yet to fully incorporate 
standardized terminology, and local police departments still operate using their own 
specific codes. 
 The SFD has implemented NIMS, and although it works relatively well, there 
is still some confusion.  This is likely to resolve itself with more time and practice.  
The SFD has made a shift to using plain language.  However, these efforts have been 
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complicated by the fact that local police departments still use departmental codes that 
are not standard for NIMS or ICS.  Staging protocols for personnel have also been 
established and have been effective in tracking personnel in incident response efforts. 
 The NHPD officer has no recollection of receiving NIMS or ICS training, so 
the extent to which they have been implemented is unclear.  The NHPD uses its own 
codes that differ from other police departments or first responder agencies, and its 
command structure does not conform to any standardized procedures.  Most protocols 
for responding to an incident are developed on the fly and are not formalized.   
 
Equipment and resources 
 
 The MTFD has two sets of personal protective equipment that have been 
provided through the tribe and federal and state grants and are not standard issue.  
The MTFD has also been equipped with hazmat decontamination trailers and meters, 
as well as Geiger counters (a portable device used to detect ionizing radiation or 
nuclear radiation) and a small chemical lab.  To track resources and personnel, fire 
chiefs and incident commanders with the MTFD still rely largely on low-technology 
systems, such as pen and paper or white boards.  Some are beginning to use software 
and laptops, but these systems are more expensive. 
 The SFD has CBRNE (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and 
explosives) equipment in addition to hazmat and blood borne pathogens suits.  They 
also have meters to detect these agents and decontamination showers that can be set 
up in the event of exposure.  Members of the SFD have participated in training to 
prepare for hazmat or other terrorist incidents, although the trainings have decreased 
in frequency in the years after 9/11.  Officers with the SFD have more advanced 
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technology to track personnel, which involve ‘touch-and-track’ scans that scan 
personnel into a software system so that personnel can be monitored and moved 
around electronically.  The SFD also uses a system that provides critical information 
for personnel, including contact information and medical records. 
 The NHPD provides personal protection equipment such as hazmat suits for 
the specialized units; however, this equipment is not standard issue.  Some officers 
have been provided portable radiation detectors that are helpful in train stations or 
with suspicious packages or luggage, but these are not provided department-wide. 
 
Recommendations 
 
 Based on the information gathered from the different reports, newspaper 
articles and agency websites, in addition to the insight offered by the three first 
responders, the following recommendations would contribute to effective emergency 
preparedness initiatives and response efforts. 
 
Communications 
 
 Interoperability of communications remains a challenge throughout the State 
of Connecticut.  A system like the Connecticut Statewide Police Emergency Radio 
Network should be developed and implemented across the State so that police, fire, 
and EMS can communicate with each other.  If this network is used, however, it 
should eliminate the State Police as the go-between and should rather just connect 
first responders directly.  To ensure that communications capabilities are maintained 
in the event of a large-scale power outage, plans to be followed in the event of a 
communications failure should be developed and implemented, along with training 
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and exercises so that personnel are familiar with the procedures, and weaknesses are 
identified prior to such an event occurring. 
 
Interagency coordination and mutual aid agreements 
 
 More extensive interagency coordination should be implemented, particularly 
with training sessions and regional exercises so that departments and agencies are 
more familiar with each other and with resources at other departments.  It would be 
beneficial for the SFD and NHDP to engage in regional training and exercises with 
agencies and departments in New York City so that in the event of a catastrophic 
event in the NYC metropolitan area interagency coordination would be successful 
and effective.  Training and exercises could either be functional in nature (i.e. 
focusing on how ICS will be employed or mutual aid agreements will be carried out) 
or situational (i.e. what would happen in the event of a nuclear attack on the 
MetroNorth rail line or an outbreak of anthrax).  These advances should be reflected 
in mutual aid agreements so that there is a clearer sense of what resources would be 
available from each department during a certain type of incident.   
 
Standard operating procedures 
 
 More detailed SOPs for off-duty and unassigned personnel need to be 
developed and practiced so that accountability is not compromised in a response 
effort.  Credentialing procedures should be standardized across the State so that 
personnel receive identical identification tags depending on their role or certification 
so they can be quickly and easily identified.  Police departments across the State need 
to become compliant with standards of NIMS and ICS so that response efforts 
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involving law enforcement, fire, and EMS services can be more effectively 
coordinated.   
 
Equipment and resources     
 
 All first responders should be provided personal protective equipment so that 
their ability to respond in a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear event are not 
compromised because they do not have sufficient equipment to protect themselves.  
More advanced systems to track personnel and resources should be installed across 
the State so that there is a more accurate record of their deployment that can be 
backed up in the event that the central system is destroyed.   
 
Summary 
 Progress has been made in the State of Connecticut to enhance its ability to 
respond to an incident, largely due to lessons learned from previous emergencies, 
including 9/11 and the Northeast Blackout of 2003.   They have been further tested by 
the federal TOPOFF 3 exercise.  However, further improvements are needed so that 
in the event of a large-scale emergency that involves multiple jurisdictions and 
agencies, first responders can effectively respond to the incident. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
 This work was undertaken to test the thesis that although following the 9/11 
attacks many proposals were made to improve the country’s ability to respond to 
large-scale domestic emergencies, the lessons of 9/11 did not result in substantially 
improved response capabilities.  Therefore, the U.S. is more vulnerable to terrorist 
attacks and other large-scale emergencies.  Few of the lessons from large-scale 
emergencies such as the 9/11 attacks and the Northeast Blackout of 2003 have been 
incorporated into emergency management plans and practices at the local, state, and 
federal levels.  There is a significant imbalance between the heavy focus on initiatives 
abroad and those that would improve domestic response capabilities.  This reflects a 
glaring weakness in U.S. national security policy. 
 To test this thesis, this work addressed five main research questions.  First, 
what lessons about domestic disaster preparedness and response were learned from 
the response to 9/11?  Second, to what extent were the lessons learned from 9/11 
implemented, and how were those lessons reflected in the response to other large-
scale emergencies such as the Northeast Blackout of 2003?  Third, what lessons were 
learned from the Northeast Blackout, and to what degree have they been reflected in 
changes to emergency preparedness and response initiatives in Connecticut?  Fourth, 
what are the national security implications that can be drawn from the responses to 
these large-scale emergences?  Lastly, in what ways can the U.S. domestic disaster 
response be improved to meet the country’s national security needs? 
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 The first part of this chapter summarizes key findings and trends.  The second 
part analyzes the implications for national security.  The third part outlines how this 
work contributes to the literature.  The chapter concludes by identifying areas for 
future study. 
 
Findings    
 
The analysis from the first three chapters revealed that problems still remain 
in the ability of the U.S. to respond to large-scale emergencies.  While some 
improvements have been made for first responders, including advances in 
communications systems, they still remain unprepared to respond to a large-scale 
domestic emergency.  First responders are an integral component of response efforts, 
yet they still lack adequate training, equipment, sophisticated tracking systems, or 
sufficient interagency communication abilities.  
 Cooperation between neighboring jurisdictions has improved and there have 
been some efforts to coordinate across state borders.  For example, transportation 
agencies in New York and Connecticut work together regularly and have created a 
committee to facilitate information sharing.  Despite these efforts, however, regional 
cooperation is still lacking.  If a large-scale incident ever occurred again in New York 
City, first responders from Connecticut, particularly from New Haven County, would 
not be familiar with New York City’s emergency management practices.  If more 
regional exercises and trainings were undertaken, first responders in Connecticut 
would be better prepared to assist New York City.  As some of the National Planning 
Scenarios show, a terrorist attack could potentially affect many people or have a wide 
impact-area, necessitating the activation of mutual aid agreements with neighboring 
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cities or states.  Due to this potentiality, mutual aid agreements need to be reinforced 
and more interagency training and exercises should be carried out.   
 Standard operating procedures are not as extensively adopted as they should 
be.  For example, police officers in New Haven are not familiar with the National 
Incident Management System or the Incident Command System structure.  That raises 
two questions for which, so far, there is insufficient data.  How many other first 
responders have yet to be trained in these critical programs?  Do they have the 
resources to respond effectively to a large-scale emergency?  Throughout the nation, 
compliance with NIMS and ICS should be statewide and strengthened with training 
and exercises.  While mutual aid agreements exist, they often do not include an 
inventory of the resources that other jurisdictions would be able to contribute.  
Additionally, credentialing needs to be more standardized so that first responders 
from different agencies or jurisdictions can be allowed on-scene to support response 
efforts.       
 The State of Connecticut has not yet been the target of a terrorist attack, so it 
is impossible to have an accurate sense of how prepared it is to manage a large-scale 
emergency.  While exercises like TOPOFF 3 provide insight into Connecticut’s level 
of preparedness, nothing short of an actual terrorist attack or other serious incident 
will reveal all the weaknesses that exist in emergency management practices.  
However, the State of Connecticut should continue to refine its program of simulated 
large-scale emergencies like TOPOFF 3 to improve its capacity to respond and 
recover. 
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Implications for National Security 
 To be secure, a nation must seek to reduce the potential for attack from 
abroad, but because complete security against such attacks is never possible, it must 
also develop rapid, effective response capabilities for large-scale emergencies at 
home.  Following the 9/11 attacks the U.S. has emphasized the former, viewing 
national security as an issue of “war” against foreign terrorists that involves major 
military and foreign policy initiatives.  That strategy has dominated policy for 
domestic homeland security as well by focusing heavily on intelligence and 
investigation.  Yet actual security in each area is weakened if both are not 
strengthened.  Rather than considering them as two entirely different policy areas, the 
ways in which they support each other and interconnect should be emphasized.  One 
cannot have an effective military and foreign security policy without an effective 
domestic security policy, and vice versa.  No matter how much the U.S. focuses on 
issues abroad, if the U.S. cannot provide adequate resources and training 
domestically, it will not be able to respond to and recover from a large-scale 
emergency.  Since security analysts maintain that it is inevitable that the U.S. will be 
the target of another terrorist attack, more focus should be given to ensuring that our 
domestic emergency response capacity is robust and aggressive.  
 
Contribution to the Literature 
 
 This work contributes two important things to the literature.  The first is a 
detailed analysis of two large-scale domestic emergencies, the 9/11 attacks and the 
Northeast Blackout of 2003.  These two events have not previously been studied 
together in such depth, nor have the relevant reports and articles published about them 
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been compiled into one work.  There are many similarities between these two events 
that illustrate how domestic emergency preparedness is still viewed as different, and 
to a certain degree less important, than the “war on terrorism” as defined by the Bush 
administration.  This work’s analysis demonstrates the implications for national 
security that were inherent in the flawed responses to these incidents.   
The second significant contribution is an analysis of the degree to which 
lessons from 9/11 and the Blackout have been implemented using one state, 
Connecticut, as a case study.  While the University of Connecticut prepared an After-
Action Report following the TOPOFF 3 exercise, this exercise and subsequent report 
only focused on one area of Connecticut and its ability to respond to a certain type of 
disaster.  This study went beyond that report by demonstrating areas of improvement 
or weakness in the years following the TOPOFF 3 exercise.   
Furthermore, interviews that were conducted provided original research and 
contributed to the overall understanding of the extent to which lessons have been 
implemented for first responders in Connecticut.  While research had suggested that 
first responders in Connecticut were sufficiently prepared and significant efforts had 
been made to enhance emergency preparedness and response activities, the first 
responders provided the context for those achievements and revealed areas in which 
they experienced inadequate preparation and inconsistencies in state-wide emergency 
response initiatives.   
 
Areas for Further Study 
 
  This work used the State of Connecticut as a case study to determine the 
extent to which lessons have been implemented to enhance emergency management 
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practices.  Connecticut is not representative of all other areas of the U.S., so further 
research should include other states.  Particular attention should be paid to states and 
regions where the threat of terrorist attack or natural disaster is especially high.  
Similarly, a broader range of interviews with first responders would provide a 
clearer picture of how prepared Connecticut is to respond effectively to a disaster.  
Other people involved in emergency response, such as hospital administrators, 
emergency medical services personnel, transportation and public utilities personnel, 
and emergency planners and managers could be interviewed to get a sense of how 
prepared other agencies are for a large-scale emergency.   
While transportation plans and evacuation procedures were examined, in part 
through online research, they were not supplemented by interviews with 
transportation personnel or emergency managers to identify weaknesses in these 
plans.  Research could be done to determine if state-wide initiatives have been carried 
out successfully or if more work remains to be done to enhance the ability for the 
State of Connecticut to evacuate or move large populations in an emergency situation. 
More research could be done to assess hospital emergency preparedness and 
the ability of the U.S. public health infrastructure to respond to a large-scale 
emergency.  While recommendations for hospitals and the healthcare system were put 
forth in the aftermath of the Northeast Blackout, a review of the status of those 
recommendations would be helpful in identifying areas for further improvement. 
Furthermore, representatives from the private sector could be interviewed to 
assess how prepared they are for an emergency and how effective are their continuity 
of operations plans.  In general, more research could be done to identify areas where 
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the private sector has been proactive in its emergency management practices or areas 
where more improvement is needed.   
Further research could include analyzing different types of large-scale 
emergencies, such as natural disasters and public health emergencies, including the 
anthrax scare and the H1N1 outbreak.  These would provide additional lessons for 
improving emergency management practices.  Analysis of international terrorist 
attacks, such as the Madrid bombings and attacks on the London public transportation 
system, might also offer more insight into how agencies in the U.S. can better prepare 
for a terrorist incident.  Additionally, while the U.S. has not been the target of a large-
scale cyber attack, this is an area where the U.S. is particularly vulnerable.  Therefore, 
more research could be done to understand the response to small-scale cyber 
incidents, what the international community has done to prepare for and respond to a 
debilitating cyber attack, and ways in which our ability to respond to a cyber attack 
could be enhanced.     
Further study could include a more extensive analysis of the degree to which 
the federal government has acted on recommendations put forth after the 9/11 attacks.  
Additionally, while the Department of Homeland Security was created at the 
recommendation of the 9/11 Commission, there has been some debate about whether 
this agency is effective.  Some argue that the lack of information sharing and 
interagency coordination is being perpetuated because the DHS does not include 
agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation or the Central Intelligence 
Agency, which are an integral part of homeland security issues. 
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Additionally, more research could be done to determine how quickly federal 
grants are disbursed and if those grants have had a positive impact on emergency 
preparedness initiatives.  Since Congress is so influential in distributing federal 
money to states, their role in emergency preparedness could be more closely 
scrutinized as well. 
This research has answered the initial research questions.  It has proven the 
initial thesis to be correct in that there are many ways in which the U.S. remains 
deficient in being able to respond to large-scale domestic emergencies.  However, 
there has been some improvement as seen in the response to the Northeast Blackout 
of 2003.  Though not within the scope this work, the emergency produced by 
Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and the offshore oil rig explosion of 2010 reflect the 
continuing weaknesses.  The results of this research are indicative but naturally 
cannot be exhaustive.  They do, however, point to a rich variety of areas for further 
research in the field. 
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